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Global climate change, resulting from the global 
accumulation of heat-trapping greenhouse gases, has not only 
become a dominant environmental issue, it is becoming a defining 
international and social issue.  Not only does the prospect of global 
climate change present potential environmental changes on a scale 
not seen in recorded history, but the challenges for international 
social order are unprecedented.  Never before in the history of 
international relations have the nations of the world been 
confronted with an environmental risk with implications that are so 
far-reaching in both space and time.  And with the sweeping past 
and prospective inequalities around the world in wealth and human 
welfare that are somehow connected to the problem of climate 
change, other international social issues begin to pale in 
comparative significance. 
Exactly why the nations of the world have had difficulty in 
reaching agreement on limiting greenhouse gas emissions is 
something of a puzzle.  An economic argument can be made that 
the world will continue to grow wealthier, as it has for centuries,1 
so that reducing greenhouse gas emissions now to avoid climate 
impacts in the future would essentially be transferring wealth to an 
even wealthier future generation.2  However, there are non-trivial 
 
 1 Most integrated assessment models—models that link a model of 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change with a model of economic 
activity—build in fairly standard models of economic growth, which most 
economists believe will continue even in the face of a changed climate.  Thomas 
Sterner & U. Martin Persson, An Even Sterner Review: Introducing Relative 
Prices into the Discounting Debate, 2 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 61, 63 (2008) 
(“Most economists, including Stern, appear to believe we will have much higher 
incomes in the future, despite climate change. But the risk of perhaps being only 
eleven—instead of thirteen—times as rich in the year 2200 is unlikely to get 
many people upset about climate change.”); see also WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A 
QUESTION OF BALANCE 108 (2008) (“First, the model assumes continued rapid 
economic growth in the years ahead, although with slightly slower growth than 
over the past four decades.”).  Nicholas Stern, in his widely discussed 
commissioned report, is less transparent about his assumptions regarding 
economic growth, but he clearly believes that economic growth will continue 
even in the face of climate change (assuming that catastrophes do not cripple 
economies).  See NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE 35 fig.2.3 (2007) [hereinafter STERN REVIEW] (showing a 
conceptual graph of economic growth paths, with a higher long-term growth path 
if greenhouse gas mitigation is undertaken), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm. 
 2 This argument was first and most eloquently made by Nobel Laureate and 
economist Thomas Schelling.  Schelling, Intergenerational Discounting, 23 
ENERGY POL’Y 395 (1995). 
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risks that the effects of climate change will be catastrophic, and if 
the current rates of climate change continue, future generations 
will face a significant and continuing loss in average welfare.3  For 
one thing, as higher global temperatures increasingly degrade 
environmental quality, the marginal value of environmental quality 
increases, making further environmental deteriorations more costly 
than typically estimated by economic models.4  But more 
frighteningly, global climate change is alone among environmental 
problems in posing the risk of such vast environmental changes 
that the effects could destabilize entire economies, countries, and 
regions.  Some studies of future climate impacts project some dire 
possibilities: global consumption could fall to less than 1 percent 
of current levels.5  This is not future generations doing without 
four-terabyte iPods; this is future generations in developed 
countries having to queue up for food and drinking water.  
Economist Martin Weitzman has observed that even if the 
probability of these kinds of outcomes is quite small, some 
precautions might be warranted, even if they might not seem 
warranted under traditional cost-benefit analyses.6 
Even a small risk of such calamity should be enough to 
compel the nations of the world to agree to some fundamental, and 
in many cases ridiculously cheap, ways of reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions.7 Robust insurance markets exist for risks far less 
 
 3 See Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of 
Catastrophic Climate Change, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1 (2009). 
 4 See Sterner & Persson, supra note 1, at 62. 
 5 Most notably, twenty-two studies reviewed by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, a United Nations-appointed body, see infra note 11, 
have been the basis of much economic discussion, and have formed a de facto set 
of baseline projections.  The projections have been used by a number of 
economists considering the costs and benefits of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions, including William Nordhaus and Nicholas Stern, two prominent 
representatives of polar viewpoints on the costs and benefits of greenhouse gas 
reduction.  See generally NORDHAUS supra note 1; STERN REVIEW, supra note 1.  
These studies are most carefully reviewed, however, by Martin Weitzman.  See 
Weitzman, supra note 3. 
 6 See Weitzman, supra note 3, at 13 (drawing upon twenty-two studies 
reviewed by the I.P.C.C. in its report, see infra note 11, and adding some 
analysis of possible positive feedback effects, following Torn and Harte, see 
infra note 13. 
 7 Many energy efficiencies would not only reduce emissions, but more than 
pay for themselves.  A recent report by the consulting firm McKinsey & 
Company found that, of forty greenhouse gas abatement strategies studied, 
seventeen had a negative cost, meaning that they represent net gains independent 
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important than the risks of cataclysmic climate change.  So why 
are the nations of the world seemingly unable to come together to 
collectively buy a small amount of insurance? 
Political economy arguments are obviously compelling.  It is 
not news that industry-based interest groups can hijack an entire 
polity and prevent it from pursuing its own best collective 
interests.  On climate change, some industries and interest groups 
have used a variety of political and psychological means to stall 
regulation of greenhouse gases.8  But even assuming the most 
craven industrial self-interests, the risk of catastrophe and the fact 
that these industries and interest groups are exposed to the same 
risks as everyone else seem to suggest that political economy 
explanations alone are insufficient to explain the collective 
paralysis. 
Another common account is that the transaction costs of 
solving such a monumental collective action problem are simply 
too great to overcome.9  However, the transaction costs of 
negotiation are not, in fact, prohibitively large, especially given the 
fact that an international framework has been in place for nearly 
two decades, and fifteen subsequent international negotiating 
rounds have been held to hammer out agreements.  Given the 
magnitude of the risk, and the availability of institutions for 
negotiating international agreements, a transaction cost 
explanation seems unsatisfying. 
This Article argues that a new theory of international climate 
change negotiations is needed, and draws upon economic game 
theory to supply one.  A number of papers have applied game 
 
of their greenhouse gas-reducing potential.  MCKINSEY & CO., PATHWAYS TO A 
LOW-CARBON ECONOMY 7 ex. 1 (2009).  For example, an estimated three trillion 
cubic feet of natural gas is lost to leakage each year.  Sealing leaks is believed to 
largely pay for itself by saving natural gas.  Andrew C. Revkin & Clifford 
Krauss, Curbing Emission by Sealing Gas Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2009, at 
A1.  Total leakage from fossil fuel extraction and distribution builds about 4 
percent of global greenhouse gas emissions annually.  STERN REVIEW, supra note 
1, at 275 box 12.3. 
 8 For example, ExxonMobil and a number of other firms have contributed to 
a campaign that highlights, in a misleading fashion, the scientific uncertainties of 
climate change and the human contributions to climate change.  See infra notes 
43–44 and accompanying text. 
 9 See, e.g., Scott Barrett, Climate Treaties and the Imperative of 
Enforcement, in THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 79 (Dieter 
Helm & Cameron Hepburn eds., 2009); TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL COLLECTIVE 
ACTION 223–25 (2004). 
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theory to the problem of international climate negotiations.10  This 
is an obvious fit, since international climate negotiations are 
strongly driven by strategic interdependencies.  What China will 
do with respect to greenhouse gas emissions depends critically on 
what the United States will do.  What developing countries are 
willing to commit depends critically on what the developed nations 
of the world are willing to commit.  The existing game-theoretic 
literature, however, has tended to model one strategic interaction at 
a time.  This Article sets forth a more general, and yet simpler, 
model, one that can be tweaked to model a number of different 
strategic interactions.  In that sense the model in this Article aims 
to be more fundamental and more general than previous game-
theoretic modeling exercises in international climate negotiations. 
Part I of this Article introduces the problem of climate change 
and the response, and suggests that the response has been 
puzzlingly inadequate.  Part II presents some possible approaches 
to explaining the failure of countries to agree to reductions in 
greenhouse gases, including the game-theoretic approach adopted 
by this Article.  Part III sets out some of the idiosyncrasies of the 
climate change problem, explaining the challenges they pose for 
modeling international climate negotiations.  Part IV sets out the 
proposed model.  Part V undertakes the bulk of the analysis in this 
Article: given a simple game-theoretic model, what happens when 
 
 10 For some of the game-theoretic treatments to date see SCOTT BARRETT, 
ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT (2005); Barbara Buchner & Carlo Carraro, 
Parallel Climate Blocs: Incentives to Cooperation in International Climate 
Negotiations, in THE DESIGN OF CLIMATE POLICY (Roger Guesnerie & Henry 
Tulkens eds., 2009); Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, Cooperation, Stability, 
and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements, in THE 
DESIGN OF CLIMATE POLICY (Roger Guesnerie & Henry Tulkens eds., 2009); 
SANDLER, supra note 9; Carlo Carraro & Domenico Siniscalco, Strategies for the 
International Protection of the Environment, 52 J. PUB. ECON. 309 (1993); 
William D. Nordhaus & Zili Yang, A Regional Dynamic General-Equilibrium 
Model of Alternative Climate Change Strategies, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 741 (1996); 
Carlo Carraro & Francesca Moriconi, International Games on Climate Change 
Control (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 1988.022, 1998), 
available at 
http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/Publication/NDL1998/NDL1998-022.pdf; 
Steven Stoft, Game Theory for Global Climate Policy (Global Energy Policy 
Ctr., Research Paper No. 10-04, 2010), available at http://www.global-
energy.org/lib/2010/ge1004-climate-game-theory-background-stoft.pdf; Peter 
John Wood, Climate Change and Game Theory (Environmental Economics 
Research Hub, Research Report No. 62, 2010), available at 
http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/research_units/eerh/pdf/EERH_RR62.pdf, and 
see also the WITCH Model discussed infra at note 52. 
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the few parameters of the model are perturbed or the assumptions 
relaxed?  This kind of modeling sensitivity analysis is the key to 
understanding some behaviors in the international climate arena.  
Part VI offers some concluding remarks. 
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE 
Sobering scientific projections are reported in the Fourth 
Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), released in 2007.11  Not yet accounting for some positive 
feedback mechanisms that may make the projections too optimistic 
(and which more recent evidence suggests are more likely and 
more troubling than previously thought12), the IPCC’s mean 
estimate of the increase in global average temperatures by the end 
of the century is an increase of 3° C, but it warns that a 
temperature rise of more than 4.5° C “cannot be excluded.”14  
Indeed, some peer-reviewed studies cited by the IPCC in its Fourth 
Assessment report consider the possibility of much higher 
temperature increases, giving rise to temperatures that exceed the 
ranges of temperatures ever experienced by human civilization.15 
There are a number of potentially cataclysmic effects of 
climate change, and almost all of them are global threats.  They 
include a rise in sea levels,16 inundating coastal areas and 
 
 11 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for 
Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS; 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF 
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (S. Solomon, D. Qin, M. 
Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M.Tignor & H.L. Miller eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) [hereinafter FOURTH ASSESSMENT], available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf.  The IPCC 
is a United Nations-appointed body of hundreds of scientists engaged in the 
science of climate change.  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
www.ipcc.ch (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).  Though often criticized, the IPCC was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, along with former U.S. Vice President Al Gore, 
in 2007. 
 12 Margaret S. Torn & John Harte, Missing Feedbacks, Asymmetric 
Uncertainties, and the Underestimation of Future Warming, 33 GEOPHYSICAL 
RES. LETTERS, at L10703 (2006). 
 14 FOURTH ASSESSMENT, supra note 11, at 65. 
 15 STERN REVIEW, supra, note 1, at 9 (studies summarized in box 1.2). 
 16 ROBERT HENSON, THE ROUGH GUIDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 111–17 (2d 
ed., 2008). 
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endangering trillions of dollars of real estate.17  Coastal cities in 
affluent societies could, at considerable cost, insulate themselves 
by erecting sea walls, but many places in the world cannot afford 
such a fix. 
Another worrying effect of climate change is a change in 
rainfall patterns so that parts of the world experience increased 
frequency and severity of droughts.18  While the total amount of 
rainfall worldwide should not change substantially, where and 
when it falls may change enough to severely disrupt local or 
regional weather patterns and the ability of some regions to store 
and utilize water.  Again, some measures can be taken to minimize 
the costs, such as increased storage and more efficient utilization 
of water, but there is only so much that human societies can do 
without adequate supplies of water.  Decreased precipitation 
leading to loss of glacial mass will also jeopardize economies built 
on hydroelectric power fed by glacial runoff.19  The flipside of the 
water shortage problem is the probable increase in the frequency of 
severe storm events,20 which will challenge the ability of many 
countries to rescue their populations from calamity.  While the 
U.S. learned some lessons in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 
an increase in the number and severity of hurricanes may again 
make a mockery of American disaster relief efforts.  One wonders 
what countries such as Indonesia and Bangladesh would do.  And 
none of this accounts for effects on vital ecosystems, such as 
wetlands and oceans, which play important yet poorly-understood 
roles in regulating climate. 
In short, the problem with climate change is that it threatens 
so many systems globally.  The breadth of risk and the scope of 
 
 17 TIM LENTON, ANTHONY FOOTITT & ANDREW DLUGOLECKI, MAJOR TIPPING 
POINTS IN THE EARTH’S CLIMATE SYSTEM AND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE 
INSURANCE SECTOR 76–77 (2009), available at http://knowledge.allianz.com/ 
nopi_downloads/downloads/TP_Final_report.pdf. 
 18 HENSON, supra note 16, at 59. 
 19 In British Columbia, for example, the Energy Plan aims to ensure that 
clean energy, including hydroelectric power, accounts for over 90 percent of the 
province’s electricity consumption.  See BRITISH COLUMBIA MINISTRY OF 
ENERGY, MINES AND PETROLEUM RESOURCES, THE BC ENERGY PLAN: A VISION 
FOR CLEAN ENERGY LEADERSHIP 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.energyplan.gov.bc.ca/PDF/BC_Energy_Plan.pdf. 
 20 FOURTH ASSESSMENT, supra note 11, at 782–84; see also HENSON, supra 
note 16, at 130, 135 (discussing growing evidence of an increase in number of 
intense hurricanes and typhoons). 
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potential changes to the biosphere threaten huge and possibly 
critical ecosystems and key components of the Earth’s 
fundamental life systems.  The risk posed by climate change is 
truly global, and affects every individual on the planet. 
None of this is news to international diplomats and 
lawmakers.  Efforts to address climate change have been underway 
for nearly two decades.  The 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, an international agreement to 
agree, contemplated the subsequent negotiation of more concrete 
and more binding agreements.  Only the third Conference of 
Parties, however, produced anything resembling an agreement to 
reduce emissions: the Kyoto Protocol.21  The Kyoto Protocol sets 
out a schedule of emissions reductions for the world’s developed 
countries, the only concrete expectations that have been expressed 
with respect to reducing emissions.  Yet, Kyoto has been the 
subject of intense criticism for a number of flaws,22 including its 
lack of any obligations for developing countries23 (a major reason 
for reluctance on the part of the U.S. to commit to binding 
emissions reductions targets),24 its perverse incentive to 
 
 21 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP1997/L.7/Add. 1, 37 I.L.M. 22 
(1998), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. 
 22 See, e.g., DAVID G. VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND 
THE STRUGGLE TO SLOW GLOBAL WARMING 24 (2001) (criticizing the Kyoto 
Protocol for being too costly and for harming national democracies); William D. 
Nordhaus, After Kyoto: Alternative Mechanisms to Control Global Warming, 96 
AM. ECON. REV. 31 (2006) (arguing global harmonized GHG taxes are better for 
emissions control than the Kyoto Protocol’s country-specific limits); Stephen M. 
Gardiner, The Global Warming Tragedy and the Dangerous Illusion of the Kyoto 
Protocol, 18 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 23 (2004) (arguing the Kyoto Protocol failed 
to sufficiently take into account interests of future generations); Sheila M. 
Olmstead and Robert N. Stavins, An International Policy Architecture for the 
Post-Kyoto Era, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 35 (2006) (arguing the Kyoto Protocol 
imposed higher costs than would result from long term targets that reduced 
emissions less in the short term and more in the long term than Kyoto). 
 23 See RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN B. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING 
CLIMATE POLICY 88–89 (2003). 
 24 President Obama, who had sought federal climate change legislation in the 
U.S., said the following in Copenhagen:  
“[W]hat’s happened obviously since 1992 is that you’ve got emerging 
countries like China and India and Brazil that have seen enormous 
economic growth and industrialization.  So we know that moving 
forward it’s going to be necessary if we’re going to meet those targets 
for some changes to take place among those countries.  It’s not enough 
just for the developed countries to make changes. Those countries are 
going to have to make some changes, as well—not of the same pace, 
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discourage the meaningful post-Kyoto participation of developing 
countries,25 and, most of all, its lack of any sanctions for 
noncompliance.26  Because failing to meet Kyoto’s country-
specific emissions targets carries no sanctions, there has been no 
incentive to actually comply with the Kyoto Protocol.  Canada, for 
example, ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, committing to a 6 
percent reduction in its greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 
levels, and then continued on its trajectory of increasing its 
greenhouse gas emissions, so that in 2005 it emitted 25 percent 
more in CO2-equivalent emissions27 than it did in 1990.28  And 
 
not in the same way, but they’re going to have to do something to 
assure that whatever carbon we’re taking out of the environment is not 
just simply dumped in by other parties.” 
Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President during Press 
Availability in Copenhagen (Dec. 18, 2009) (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-during-press-
availability-copenhagen.  See also Lisa Friedman, Potholes in the Road to 
Copenhagen Grow in Bangkok Talks, CLIMATEWIRE, Oct. 9, 2009 (discussing 
“America’s terms” that “[m]ajor developing nations must make legally binding 
commitments to temper their own global warming pollution”). 
 25 Steven Stoft, The Cause of the War over Caps and How to End It, GLOBAL 
ENERGY POLICY CENTER 1 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1427665 
(pointing out that the cap-and-trade program under Kyoto, along with the Clean 
Development Mechanism, creates a strong disincentive for developing countries 
to commit to a future national cap in a post-Kyoto regime). 
 26 See BARRETT, supra note 10, at 360–62 (“[The] Kyoto Protocol is unlikely 
to sustain meaningful cooperation. This is not for the reasons usually given—that 
Kyoto will do little to moderate climate change, that monitoring of the agreement 
will be imperfect, that its mechanisms are too complicated, and that its 
implementation will be too costly—though these criticisms are also valid. The 
main strike against Kyoto is the most crucial of all: the agreement fails to solve 
the enforcement problem.”). 
 27 CO2-equivalent emissions, or carbon dioxide-equivalents, represent an 
index of total emissions from all six greenhouse gases regulated under the Kyoto 
Protocol, which include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxides, 
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride.  The index is 
weighted by the heat-trapping effect of emissions of the different greenhouse 
gases, in comparison with the effect of a ton of carbon dioxide.  For example, 
since methane has twenty-one times the heat-trapping power of carbon dioxide, 
emissions of methane are multiplied by twenty-one for purposes of calculating 
the index.  Also, in terms of emissions trading under Kyoto, emissions of 
methane will be deemed to be twenty-one times as important as the equivalent 
emissions of carbon dioxide.  See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EMISSION 
FACTS: METRICS FOR EXPRESSING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: CARBON 
EQUIVALENTS AND CARBON DIOXIDE EQUIVALENTS (2005), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/420f05002.htm (discussing use of carbon 
dioxide equivalent metric). 
 28 ENVIRONMENT CANADA, NATIONAL INVENTORY REPORT 3 (2007), 
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with no means of controlling emissions leakage—the transfer of 
emissions from countries that regulate or price greenhouse gas 
emissions to countries that do not—Kyoto offers no assurances to 
countries undertaking costly mitigation measures that their efforts 
will be effective.  Although negotiations in Copenhagen last year 
did yield a monitoring and “transparency” agreement among some 
important emitters—most notably the U.S., China, India, and 
South Africa—it did not, as had been long planned, produce a 
successor treaty to Kyoto.  Most significantly, Kyoto has not 
actually delivered any significant emissions reductions.29 
I. WHY HAVE INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS FAILED? 
The question is not why the U.N. Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol are failures in the 
international legal sense.  The question is rather why international 
efforts at negotiation have produced such flawed efforts.  
International agreement, especially among countries that are so 
diversely situated, is always difficult.  And this is not to say that as 
a normative matter, the world is unambiguously better off if 
cooperation is achieved in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  
But given the apparent stakes, the puerile behavior and bombastic 
posturing of the world’s leaders and negotiators is a head-
scratcher.30  This Article undertakes the descriptive task of 
 
available at http://www.ec.gc.ca/Publications/default.asp?lang=En&xml= 
E80FB0A6-A0C2-4E6E-A12E-005D50D041C5.  This precludes Canada from 
realistically being able to comply with its Kyoto mandate of reducing its 
emissions to 6 percent below 1990 levels, or 560 megatons. 
 29 Greenhouse gas emissions tend to track economic activity, which declines 
during economic downturns, such as the one in 2008 and 2009.  See, e.g., U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK SUPPLEMENT: 
UNDERSTANDING THE DECLINE IN CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS IN 2009, at 1 
(2009) (reporting expected 5.9 percent decline from 2008); Press Release, U.S. 
Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Decreased by 2.2 Percent 
in 2008 (Dec. 3, 2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/press/ 
press333 html.  As of 2007, one year before the Kyoto compliance period of 
2008–2012, world carbon dioxide emissions were 30.56 gigatons.  Climate 
Analysis Indicators Tool, WORLD RESOURCES INST., http://cait.wri.org (last 
visited May 24, 2011) (obtained by dividing China’s emissions by its fraction of 
world total).  In 1997, the year of the signing (not ratification) of the Kyoto 
Protocol, world emissions were 23.64 gigatons.  Id. (obtained by dividing the 
United States’ emissions by its fraction of the world total). 
 30 For example, during negotiations at the Copenhagen conference of parties, 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao snubbed world leaders by sending an aide instead 
of attending in person, prompting President Obama to raise his voice to the 
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explaining why cooperation has been elusive. 
One explanation that has been offered for the failure of 
international climate negotiations is that climate change is a 
massive collective action problem, and the transaction costs of 
finding agreement on greenhouse gas emissions reductions are too 
great.31  A simple economic account of the climate change problem 
would be that because the benefits of emitting greenhouse gases 
are internalized within a country, but the costs spread out among 
the entire world (albeit at different levels of harm across countries 
and socioeconomic strata), emitting greenhouse gases is an over-
supplied activity.  Correcting the oversupply problem, however, is 
challenged by the costs of organizing negotiations, and actually 
undertaking those negotiations.  But this explanation would seem 
to fall short, as the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, while 
flawed, at least reduce the transaction costs of organizing and 
negotiating.  These institutions change the outcomes of 
uncooperative games so that cooperation becomes not only 
possible, but likely.32  Coasean bargaining only succumbs to 
transaction cost problems if the transaction costs exceed the 
potential gains from trade.  Insuring against the large risks posed 
by climate change would seem to present large enough upsides to 
overcome the transaction costs of bargaining, at least those having 
to do with negotiation costs.  If, on the other hand, strategic 
behavior is the problem, then this article proposes an analytical 
way forward. 
More compelling might be a political economy explanation 
focusing on the domestic politics of climate change.  Domestic 
politics can greatly complicate the task before international 
negotiators.  The Byrd-Hagel resolution, a non-binding “sense of 
the Senate” resolution, declared that the United States should not 
be a party to any agreement to reduce emission that would not also 
 
Premier, asking, “Mr. Premier, are you ready to see me?”  Peter Maer, 
Impromptu Moments Shaped Copenhagen Accord, CBS NEWS, Dec. 20, 2009, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/12/20/politics/main6000506.shtml. 
 31 See SANDLER, supra note 9, at 223–25; Barrett, supra note 9, at 79; Daniel 
H. Cole, Climate Change and Collective Action, 61 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 
2008 229, 231–32 (2009) (suggesting collective action problem impedes 
negotiation of effective climate change agreements). 
 32 See Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, Institutions Matter! Why the 
Herder Problem Is not a Prisoner’s Dilemma, 69 THEORY & DECISION 219, 223–
24, 226 (2010) (explaining that “institutions shape the payoffs, incentives, and 
dominant strategies of players in all games”). 
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require emissions reductions of developing countries.33  That 
resolution certainly complicated the efforts of American climate 
change negotiators.  In 2009, with a Democratic President 
committed to climate change legislation, and a Democrat-
controlled House of Representatives and Senate, climate change 
legislation passed the House of Representatives34 only with 
enormous concessions extracted by a variety of sectors and 
populations.35  In 2010, a similar Senate effort ended in failure in 
the wake of strong opposition to climate regulation,36 a failure that 
has triggered blame from other countries for the disappointing 
progress made in post-Copenhagen negotiations.37  This problem is 
not limited to democracies: even China, heretofore resistant to 
committing to binding greenhouse gas emissions limitations, 
sometimes has found it a challenge to speak with one voice.38  
China’s stark divide between affluent regions vulnerable to climate 
change and poor regions interested only in economic growth has 
given rise to a division of opinion on how keenly the country 
wishes to pursue greenhouse gas mitigation policies.39 
But even severe internal divisions within a country do not 
support a pure political economy explanation.  For one thing, there 
would be the question of why those that have much to lose from 
climate change could not make a transfer payment to those, such as 
the oil and coal industries, that are opposed to greenhouse gas 
 
 33 S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 34 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (Waxman-Markey Bill). 
 35 For one of many analyses of the Waxman-Markey bill and the political 
concessions that were made in order to obtain passage, see Shi-Ling Hsu, Nine 
Reasons to Adopt a Carbon Tax 9 (May 17, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1405944. 
 36 See Robin Bravender & Katie Howell, Reid Pronounces Climate Bill 
Dead, Sees Hope for Energy Bill, GREENWIRE, Sept. 8, 2010, 
http://www.eenews net/Greenwire/print/2010/09/08/4. 
 37 Lisa Friedman, U.S. Accuses Countries of ‘Walking Back’ from 
Copenhagen Accord, CLIMATEWIRE, Aug. 9, 2010, http://www.eenews net/ 
climatewire/print/2010/08/09/5. 
 38 See Edward Wong & Jonathan Ansfield, China Insists That Its Steps on 
Climate Be Voluntary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, at A5 (noting that while a 
Chinese negotiator at Copenhagen publicly scolded President Obama and 
wagged his finger at Obama, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao told the 
interpreter to ignore the official’s remarks). 
 39 Daniel Abebe & Jonathan Masur, International Agreements, Internal 
Heterogeneity, and Climate Change: The Two Chinas Problem, 50 VA. J. INT’L. 
L. 325 (2010). 
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regulation.  After all, the 2009 American Clean Energy and 
Security Act (or Waxman-Markey, after the bill’s sponsors)40 
included lavish legislative giveaways to coal-burning electric 
utilities and other industries that would be negatively affected by 
greenhouse gas regulation.41  Transfer payments could even be 
transnational—they could flow from those with much to lose to 
those that prefer economic development in another country.  The 
Kyoto Protocol has “flexibility mechanisms” such as the Clean 
Development Mechanism, which provides for developed-country 
funding of projects in developing countries that supposedly reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. While the Clean Development 
Mechanism has come under intense criticism for not actually 
producing emissions reductions,42 it still stands as evidence that 
transnational transfer payments are possible, and even 
institutionalized, within the UNFCCC framework. 
A second reason that a political economy explanation seems 
to fall short is that the threats of climate change are global, and no 
one will be spared at least some serious ill effects.  It may be true 
that a personal cost-benefit analysis of whether one would favor 
greenhouse gas mitigation at some personal cost would be vastly 
different for differently-situated individuals throughout the world, 
but climate change is not a trifling matter for anyone.  And yet the 
way that some interests seem to treat the issue suggests that the 
impacts of climate change are irrelevant.  The way that oil 
companies and some other industries cravenly manipulated public 
opinion in order to sow doubt about the scientific consensus 
regarding climate change43 evinces little regard for a dangerous 
truth that will ultimately affect these firms as much as others.  For 
example, political economy explanations do not explain the 
 
 40 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
 41 The “grandfathering” of tradable emissions permits under Waxman-
Markey, or the free allocation of permits, was worth an estimated $378 billion.  
35 percent of the grandfathered permits were allocated to electric utilities.  Hsu, 
supra note 35, at 9. 
 42 See, e.g., Michael W. Wara & David G. Victor, A Realistic Policy on 
International Carbon Offsets (Program on Energy and Sustainable Dev. at 
Freeman Spogli Inst. for Int’l Studies, Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 74, 
2008), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22157/WP74_final_final.pdf. 
 43 See Aaron M. McCright & Riley E. Dunlap, Defeating Kyoto: The 
Conservative Movement’s Impact on U.S. Climate Change Policy, 50 SOC. 
PROBS. 348 (2003). 
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difference between the approach taken by two of the largest 
integrated petroleum products firms in the world: BP, which 
sought to embrace a low-carbon future early on, and Exxon Mobil, 
one of the leading opponents of greenhouse gas regulation and a 
source of funding for detractors of climate change science.44  It 
could well be that some firms, such as Exxon Mobil, would benefit 
from a respite from greenhouse regulation to give them some time 
to diversify their corporate investments into lower-carbon 
industries.  But on some level, even these firms must recognize 
that the heroic measures that they are undertaking to derail 
greenhouse gas regulation and foil global cooperation poses a 
threat to the entire planet, including the firms themselves, which, 
unlike human beings, could live on indefinitely.  There is 
something else going on other than a simple self-interested 
gerrymandering of public policy. 
A final possible explanation emerges from new research on 
the psychological aspects of climate change, which suggests that 
people simply may not believe that climate change is truly a 
problem or a risk.45  If this is the case, then a proper response 
would include a fairly radical set of public policies aimed at public 
outreach and education, bridging a gap between what scientists 
know and what the public knows.  But this explanation also leaves 
questions unanswered: do our national leaders and international 
negotiators believe that climate change presents a serious risk?  If 
 
 44 For an analysis comparing Exxon Mobil and BP Amoco, see Ian H 
Rowlands, Beauty and the Beast? BP’s and Exxon’s Positions on Global Climate 
Change, 18 ENV’T & PLAN. C: GOV’T & POL’Y 339 (2000); Ingvild Andreassen 
Sæverud & Jon Birger Skjærseth, Oil Companies and Climate Change: 
Inconsistencies Between Strategy Formulation and Implementation?, 7 GLOBAL 
ENVTL. POL. 42 (2007).  Exxon has funded the Global Climate Coalition, which 
uses tactics similar to those used by tobacco companies to sow doubt that 
smoking leads to lung cancer.  UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SMOKE, 
MIRRORS & HOT AIR: HOW EXXONMOBIL USES BIG TOBACCO’S TACTICS TO 
MANUFACTURE UNCERTAINTY ON CLIMATE SCIENCE 9 (2007). 
 45 See ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEV. REP. 
2007/2008: PUBLIC PERCEPTION, OPINION, AND UNDERSTANDING OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE – CURRENT PATTERNS, TRENDS, AND LIMITATIONS 7, 14–15 (2008), 
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/papers/ 
leiserowitz_anthony.pdf; see also Elke U. Weber, Experience-based and 
Description-based Perceptions of Long-term Risk: Why Global Warming Does 
Not Scare Us (Yet), 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 103, 103–04 (2006) (“The absence of 
a visceral response on part of the public to the risks posed by global warming 
may be responsible for the arguably less than optimal allocation of personal and 
collective resources to deal with this issue.”). 
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so, then why do they negotiate with each other—fellow believers, 
presumably—rather than try to change the public perceptions of 
climate change?  If not, then why would they bother with the 
elaborate charade of appearing to try to negotiate an international 
solution?  With respect to national leaders and international 
negotiators, either they believe it or they don’t, but if the problem 
is the public psychology and perception of climate change, the 
current path of negotiations is not a sensible response. 
None of the above explanations for the failure to reach 
agreement on an international solution pays attention to the 
strategic interactions among countries as individual players.  
Undoubtedly, there are political economy issues, transaction cost 
issues, and issues of political will tied to psychological obstacles to 
recognizing the danger from climate change.  But in the end, the 
problem that seems to animate international climate negotiations 
most is the problem of one country waiting to see what another 
country will do, because what countries do profoundly affects the 
decision environment for other countries.  Climate change is a 
collective action problem writ large; only in a cooperative outcome 
in which costly mitigation is undertaken is cooperating even 
remotely rational.  Without reassurances from other countries of 
cooperation, it is extremely difficult to undertake a cooperative 
course of action. 
In the vernacular of international relations theory, this article 
takes a realist approach to explaining climate negotiations, 
working from very simple assumptions that countries are self-
interested and rational.46  This is not to deny that alternative 
intellectual approaches would have much to say about climate 
negotiations, especially in examining the complexities of domestic 
politics and how they affect international negotiations.  However, 
the question addressed by this Article is fundamentally a realist 
 
 46 Realism in international relations theory assumes that states are self-
interested rational actors and will pursue national interests.  By contrast, a 
number of rival theories have challenged the simplicity of realism, including a 
“constructivist” school that has sought to focus on non-state actors that influence 
global events and international politics, and a “neoliberal institutionalist” school 
that focuses on the role of institutions as facilitators of relations among states.  
For a review of the major theories in international law and international relations, 
see Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane & Stephen D. Krasner, International 
Organization and the Study of World Politics, 52 INT’L ORG. 645 (1998); Harold 
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 
(1997). 
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one: why are states seemingly behaving irrationally, and not 
pursuing their national self-interests?  Doubtless many theories 
could provide some explanation, but in light of the 
interdependencies that seem to animate international climate 
negotiations, this Article seeks to provide a realist explanation for 
what appears to be anomalous behavior. 
This Article draws upon economic game theory, modeling 
state actors as individual players.  Game-theoretic models of 
climate strategies have previously been developed to model 
international climate negotiations.  In Environment and Statecraft, 
Scott Barrett sets out some principles of a theory on what would 
make for successful international agreement to reduce greenhouse 
gases.47  Drawing extensively on game theory, Barrett concludes 
that the way to solve the twin problems of participation and 
enforcement that have plagued Kyoto is first to agree to research 
and development funding to lower the costs of greenhouse gas 
reduction, and second to agree to technological standards—
command-and-control regulation—of greenhouse gas reduction so 
as to create network incentives for adoption.48  Joining the 
agreement would be, like the adoption of Microsoft Windows, an 
economic necessity.  Barrett has, in his subsequent work, further 
developed his theory on technological development as the subject 
of a treaty, showing that promoting some technologies as part of a 
treaty may, under certain circumstances, induce greater 
cooperation.49  This would be true if there existed a technology 
that could produce positive network externalities, where adoption 
brings its own benefits—again, not unlike adopting something like 
Microsoft Windows.  What is still missing from the economic 
literature, however, is a simple model that can accommodate a 
broad range of strategic behaviors of countries in climate 
negotiations. 
Other game-theoretic models of climate negotiations have 
been incorporated into sophisticated economic models that devote 
many lines of code to simulating the optimal path of greenhouse 
gas mitigation for different countries over long periods of time.50  
 
 47 BARRETT, supra note 10. 
 48 BARRETT, supra note 10, at 393–96. 
 49 Scott Barrett, Climate Treaties and Backstop Technologies 19 (CESifo, 
Working Paper No. 3003, 2010); see also Scott Barrett, Kyoto and Beyond: 
Alternative Approaches to Global Warming, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 25 (2005). 
 50 These include the model in Nordhaus & Yang, supra note 10, and the 
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These models typically divide the world into a handful of regions 
consisting of one or more countries—the United States and China 
are usually “regions” all by themselves51—and model the optimal 
amount of greenhouse gas abatement over time horizons of fifty to 
one hundred years.  The World Induced Technical Change Hybrid 
model, or the WITCH model,52 developed by researchers at the 
environmental economic research organization Fondazione Eni 
Enrico Mattei, incorporates a game-theoretic component into an 
integrated assessment model (a complex model that integrates 
economic activity and climate feedbacks).53  WITCH divides the 
world into twelve regions and models their behavior over a period 
of one hundred years, in five-year increments.  The game-theoretic 
component, however, only involves game-theoretic decisions at 
two stages: a stage in which formations of coalitions are made 
among regions agreeing to reduce emissions, and a second stage in 
which an optimal emissions level is chosen by coalitions (countries 
acting in concert) and countries that did not join a coalition in the 
first stage.54 
While these models delve deeply into economic forecasting, 
they do not test different game-theoretic assumptions and explore 
how outcomes might change as assumptions change.  These 
 
WITCH model, discussed infra note 52. 
 51 See, e.g., Nordhaus & Yang, supra note 10, at 743 (William Nordhaus’s 
early RICE model (Regional Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy) 
divided the world into ten regions: the U.S., China, the E.U., Japan, the former 
Soviet Union republics, India, Brazil, and Indonesia, i.e. 11 large countries, 38 
medium-sized countries, and 137 small countries).  See also WITCH model, 
infra note 52. 
 52 The WITCH model (World Induced Technical Change Hybrid model) was 
developed by a number of Italian researchers.  It divides the world into twelve 
regions: the U.S., China, Western E.U. countries, Eastern E.U. countries, Japan 
and Korea, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Latin America, Middle East and North 
Africa, Africa, Non-E.U. Eastern European countries, and Australia and New 
Zealand.  WITCH builds in a number of features previously not a part of 
integrated assessment models, such as endogenous models of technological 
change.  See WITCH MODEL DESCRIPTION, http://www.witchmodel.org/pag/ 
model html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010); see also Valentina Bosetti et al., 
International Climate Coalitions: A Game-Theoretic Analysis Using the WITCH 
Model (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 325, 2009), available 
at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1336&context=feem. 
 53 Integrated assessment models link climate change effects and economic 
activity and effects in a joint climate and economic model to project climate 
changes and economic costs and benefits together.  For a review of some 
integrated assessment models, see STERN REVIEW, supra note 1, at 145–52. 
 54 Bosetti et al., supra note 52, at 7. 
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models are heavy on the economic analytics, but light on the 
simpler game-theoretic interactions among countries that are 
frustrating progress towards negotiated solutions to the climate 
change problem. 
This article proposes a simple dynamic game-theoretic model, 
with a view towards perturbing a number of assumptions in the 
model to see how outcomes might be affected.  The complexity of 
the climate change problem is such that no single model can 
capture all of the strategic behaviors in play in international 
climate negotiations.  What seems more useful is a simple model 
to highlight the most prevalent and important behaviors, and 
suggest some non-obvious policy directions. 
II. GAME-THEORETIC MODELING CHALLENGES 
IN THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONTEXT 
A model of international climate negotiations must address a 
number of issues specific to the climate change problem, or at least 
be explicit about its assumptions regarding these issues.  In broad 
brush strokes, some of the idiosyncratic features of the climate 
change problem are as follows: 
1. The public good nature of greenhouse gas reductions.  
Being a global phenomenon, the greenhouse effect provides a 
uniquely clear example of a public goods problem.  Pure public 
goods are non-excludable in provision (once the good is provided 
to one it is necessarily provided to all) and non-rival in 
consumption (the enjoyment of one person of the good does not 
detract from the enjoyment by another).55  Reductions of 
greenhouse gas emissions are perfectly non-excludable and non-
rival.  The reduction of emissions by one emitter or one country 
unavoidably inures to the benefit of everyone in the world (in the 
form of avoided risk and damages from climate change).  
Similarly, “consumption” of this benefit is necessarily enjoyed by 
everyone.  As compared to many pollution and natural resource 
problems, the climate change problem provides a perfect example 
of a public good. 
2. Free-rider effects of mitigation.  A consequence of the 
public good nature of greenhouse gas emissions reduction is the 
strong potential for free-riding.  Free-riding may take the form of 
 
 55 CHARLES D. KOLSTAD, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 95–99 (2d ed. 2011). 
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avoiding costly mitigation while allowing others to undertake it, 
and it may also take the form of avoiding the costs of research and 
development of new technologies that reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
A particularly troublesome aspect of the free-riding problem 
is that the greater the amount of mitigation undertaken by a 
country (or group of countries), the greater the incentives for free-
riding.  Countries that reduce emissions will almost certainly be 
reducing fossil fuel consumption, which reduces the global price of 
fossil fuels, which in turn encourages developing countries to 
increase the use of fossil fuels, canceling out, to some extent, the 
emissions reductions achieved by developed countries, probably at 
great economic and political cost. 
The implication of the free-riding problem is that action to 
reduce emissions may need to be universal or near-universal.  As 
the Stern Review points out, no country or even group of countries 
can solve the climate change problem alone; coordinated action is 
absolutely necessary.56  Countries thus find themselves in the 
position of knowing that their participation in an agreement to 
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions is a necessary, but far from 
sufficient, condition to the consummation of an effective 
international agreement to reduce emissions.  This is a major 
distinction between the climate change problem and the problem 
of ozone-depleting chemicals, in which a smaller number of 
countries with dominant firms were able to kick-start a broad 
phase-out of ozone-depleting chemicals.57 
Aggravating the free-riding problem is a political reality: if 
one country waits to mitigate, other countries will pay for that 
delay.  If China continues to build coal-fired power plants, the 
costs of retiring them in the future will not, as a practical matter, 
be borne by China alone.  Because such large greenhouse gas 
emitters as the U.S. and China hold the fate of the world in their 
hands, it is unlikely that their initial reluctance to act will be fully 
punished by other countries.  Put more clearly in a multilateral 
context, if either China or the U.S. is initially recalcitrant, the 
domestic politics of both countries are such that it is unlikely that 
 
 56 Mitigation will require action from developed and developing countries.  
See, e.g., STERN REVIEW, supra note 1, at 205–06. 
 57 For a discussion of international dealings with respect to the problem of 
ozone depletion, see RICHARD ELLIOTT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY (1998). 
HSU MACRO 3RD DOC 1/23/2012  1:10:47 AM 
2011] GAME THEORY AND CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS 33 
such recalcitrance will be fully punished by the rest of the world.  
In effect, the late-mitigating countries would be free-riding on the 
efforts of early-mitigating countries to develop technologies and 
processes that reduce emissions. 
3. Uncertainty regarding damages and adaptation costs.  
Despite a tremendous worldwide research effort, and despite the 
efforts of the Nobel prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, scientific uncertainty continues to pose problems 
with predictions.  It is still not clear which effects will occur, 
where they will occur, when they will occur, and how serious they 
will be when and if they occur.  At bottom, it is still difficult to 
relate concentrations of greenhouse gases to specific global 
temperature changes.  The effects and formation of clouds, for 
example, is poorly understood.58  Whether a near-catastrophic 
“burp” of methane previously locked up in Arctic boreal forests 
will occur, and how much of a temperature change that would 
induce, is unknown.59  Even for what one would think to be a 
relatively straightforward projection, such as the extent of sea level 
rise, predictions are complicated by numerous uncertainties 
regarding the extent of ice melt that would pour massive quantities 
of fresh water into the oceans, the degree and nature of thermal 
expansion that would exacerbate sea level rises, and the extent to 
which carbon absorption by oceans would ameliorate warming 
effects.60 
All of this uncertainty makes it difficult for present-day 
national governments to understand the future impacts of climate 
change, let alone communicate the risk to its citizenries and plan 
for their futures.  And yet, if a country adopts a formal or de facto 
cost-benefit approach for deciding whether or not to undertake 
greenhouse gas emissions mitigation, this piece of information 
would seem to be indispensable.  Rational policy becomes difficult 
to formulate, and more difficult to justify to an electorate. 
One consequence of this uncertainty may be that as 
 
 58 See, e.g., Rong Zhang, Sarah M. Kang & Isaac M. Held, Sensitivity of 
Climate Change Induced by the Weakening of the Atlantic Meridional 
Overturning Circulation to Cloud Feedback, 23 J. CLIMATE 378 (2010); 
GODDARD INSTITUTE FOR SPACE STUDIES, SCIENCE BRIEFS - CLOUDS AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE THICK AND THIN OF IT (2000), available at 
http://www.giss.nasa.gov/research/briefs/delgenio_03/. 
 59 HENSON, supra note 16, at 86. 
 60 Id. at 109–18. 
HSU MACRO 3RD DOC 1/23/2012  1:10:47 AM 
34 N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Volume 19 
information changes, a country’s perception of its vulnerability to 
climate change may change.  This is especially true in light of 
recent studies that have shown a considerable gap in understanding 
between climate scientists and the general public.61  Disconcerting 
as it may be, a game-theoretic analysis will need to at least account 
for the possibility that a country’s perception of its climate change 
damages may change over time. 
4. Discounting.  Even more so than many environmental and 
natural resource problems, the burdens of mitigation and the 
benefits of avoiding climate change are separated in time.  While 
some of the effects of climate change are already being felt, the 
most serious effects are likely to occur in the very long term, fifty 
to two hundred years from now,62 making cost-benefit analyses 
extremely sensitive to the discount rate (or rates) utilized.  The 
complicated nature of this issue and the enormous economic 
implications have deeply divided economists.  Most notably, Sir 
Nicholas Stern, who was commissioned by the U.K. government to 
perform a cost-benefit analysis of action to avoid climate change,63 
and Yale economist William Nordhaus, a leading developer of 
integrated assessment models, have disagreed sharply about the 
appropriate discount rate.  The discount rate is a critical difference 
in the ways that the two prominent economists have analyzed the 
climate change problem and reached dramatically different 
conclusions.64  The division has made for unusually entertaining 
theater for academics.65 
Discounting as a purely economic concept is controversial 
enough; asking the additional question in a descriptive political 
 
 61 See LEISEROWITZ, supra note 45, at 18–20. 
 62 See, e.g., HENSON, supra note 16, at 15 (“If emissions continue to rise 
unabated through this century, the Greenland and/or West Antarctica ice sheets 
could be thrown into an unstoppable melting cycle that would raise sea levels by 
more than 7 m (23 ft) each. This process would take some time to unfold – 
probably a few centuries, although nobody can pin it down at this point . . . .”). 
 63 STERN REVIEW, supra note 1. 
 64 A number of issues divide the two economists, but the issue of the 
appropriate discount rate seems to generate the most controversy.  For a review 
of these disagreements, see Daniel H. Cole, The Stern Review and Its Critics: 
Implications for the Theory and Practice of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 48 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 53, 60–78 (2008). 
 65 Nordhaus has written that the Stern Review was essentially “political in 
nature and has advocacy as its purpose.”  William D. Nordhaus, A Review of the 
Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
686, 688 (2007). 
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context makes matters even more complicated.  Almost anything 
that is decided in the climate change context, including the 
decision to do nothing, presents inter-generational tradeoffs.  For 
purposes of developing a game-theoretic model, a discount rate 
must reflect not so much a normative judgment, but a positive 
description of countries’ political behavior with respect to climate 
change.  That is, how much will politicians discount the welfare of 
future generations, beyond what a purely economic analysis would 
call for?  Even if this challenging question is not wrestled down to 
a conclusion, the sensitivity of payoffs to assumptions regarding 
the discount rate must be taken into account. 
A final consideration is that delayed action, allowing 
concentrations to go higher before more drastic cuts are 
undertaken, poses risks of some irreversible ecological damages 
that are often overlooked.66  It is also possible that certain 
irreversibilities in climate may take place while we are taking the 
time to study the problem.  Irreversibility is the flipside of 
discounting, working in the opposite prescriptive direction.  As a 
descriptive modeling matter, the model proposed in this Article 
does not explicitly assume that countries, in balancing costs and 
benefits of greenhouse gas mitigation, take account of 
irreversibilities. 
5. The savings in mitigation costs of early mitigation.  The 
less that is done in the near term to reduce emissions and begin the 
transition into lower-carbon economies, the more expensive it will 
be in the long run, in nominal terms, to do the same things.  
Despite their disagreements on discounting, Nicholas Stern and 
William Nordhaus both recommend gradually intensifying 
abatement effort over time to mirror the increasing social cost of 
greenhouse gas emissions.67  Delaying action is very costly; once 
emissions rise to certain levels, the emissions cuts to lower 
greenhouse gas concentrations to manageable levels become 
extremely costly.68  Again, these conclusions are sensitive to the 
 
 66 See, e.g., STERN REVIEW, supra note 1, at 72 (ocean acidification 
irreversibly disrupting marine ecosystems), 80 (loss of species), 81 (irreversible 
melting and collapse of ice sheets); see also Robert S. Pindyck, Irreversibilities 
and the Timing of Environmental Policy, 22 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 233, 
234 (2000). 
 67 STERN REVIEW, supra note 1, at 302; NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 16. 
 68 STERN REVIEW, supra note 1, at 199 (“The rate of emissions cuts required 
to meet a stabilization goal is very sensitive to both the timing of the peak in 
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discounting assumptions. 
It is certainly possible that technological development could 
lower future costs so that waiting is a rational strategy.69  It is also 
true that the costs of carbon abatement are likely to fall over the 
next twenty years.70  However, models of technological “learning” 
rates generally do not assume large jumps in technological 
innovation,71 perhaps because they rarely occur.  Thus, unless the 
discount rate is assumed to be very high, it becomes unlikely that 
waiting and delaying is an economically efficient response to 
climate change, as the decrease in costs is not likely to be as great 
as the increase in cost of delayed action.  Here again, though, the 
free-riding problem figures prominently, as a country could 
rationally wait and allow other countries to undertake the expense 
of research and development of climate reduction technologies. 
6. The role of technology.  The rate of technological 
innovation is a wild card that complicates economic modeling and 
prescriptions for the optimal path of mitigation.  Current 
developments of some technologies, such as carbon capture and 
storage technology72 or biofuels,73 have not been particularly 
encouraging.74  But at the same time, other technologies have 
 
global emissions, and its height. Delaying action now means more drastic 
emissions reductions over the coming decades.”), 211 (“Without early, well-
planned action, the costs of mitigating emissions will be greater.”). 
 69 Id, at 225–26. 
 70 Id. at 231. 
 71 Id. at 226 (“[E]stimates of learning rates from different technologies span a 
wide range, from around 3 percent to over 35 percent cost reductions associated 
with a doubling of output.”). 
 72 “Carbon capture” refers to the capture of carbon dioxide emitted as a result 
of any combustion process, while the storage stage refers to the permanent 
storage of the captured carbon dioxide, so that it does not enter the atmosphere 
and contribute to climate change.  See Howard Herzog & Dan Golomb, Carbon 
Capture and Storage from Fossil Fuel Use, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA ENERGY 277 
(2004). 
 73 Biofuels are gasoline substitutes that are derived from a variety of 
agricultural crops, such as corn and sugar.  Although biofuels are burned in an 
internal combustion engine process like ordinary gasoline, the fact that biofuels 
obtain their carbon from the normal carbon uptake process of vegetation creates 
a net zero carbon dioxide emissions process.  See generally Timothy Searchinger 
et al., Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels Increases Greenhouse Gases Through 
Emissions from Land-Use Changes, 319 SCIENCE 1238 (2008). 
 74 As recently as 2008, demonstration costs remained in the range of €60 to 
€90 per ton of CO2 stored.  This is approximately $88 to $131 per ton, using an 
exchange rate of €1.4637 to $1, the average rate for 2008.  BANK OF CANADA, 
FIN. MARKETS DEP’T, YEAR AVERAGE OF EXCHANGE RATES (2008), available at 
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emerged as surprising challengers to the worldwide fossil fuel 
hegemony, such as concentrated solar power.75  Whether the world 
sees more pleasant or unpleasant surprises may determine the fate 
of climate change. 
In addition to its role in reducing emissions, technology has 
other, more complicated roles as well.  How the world adapts to 
climate change, technologically and otherwise, may profoundly 
affect approaches to climate change.76  A country’s confidence in 
its ability to adapt to climate change may dampen its enthusiasm 
 
http://www.bank-banque-canada.ca/pdf/nraa08.pdf; MCKINSEY & CO., CARBON 
CAPTURE AND STORAGE: ASSESSING THE ECONOMICS 6 (2008), available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/ccsi/pdf/CCS_Assessing_the_Economic
s.pdf.  This places them considerably far above many other emissions abatement 
and reduction strategies.  See MCKINSEY & CO., PATHWAYS TO A LOW-CARBON 
ECONOMY 27 ex. 3.0.1 (2009) (showing that carbon capture and storage 
strategies such as “Coal CCS new build,” “Iron and steel CCS new build,” “Coal 
CCS retrofit,” and “Gas plant CCS retrofit” have higher marginal abatement 
costs than other strategies).  A more favorable report concludes that the cost of 
capturing, transporting, and storing carbon is closer to $30 per ton of CO2.  
MASS. INST. TECH., THE FUTURE OF COAL, at xi (2007), available at 
http://web mit.edu/coal/The_Future_of_Coal.pdf.  However, other studies 
suggest that the current estimates are still too low.  See, e.g., Mohammed Al-
Juaied & Adam Whitmore, Realistic Costs of Carbon Capture 17 (John F. 
Kennedy Sch. of Govt., Discussion Paper No. 2009-08, 2009) (estimating $100–
50 per ton).  The McKinsey “Pathways” report also indicates that “2nd 
generation biofuels” have a relatively high marginal abatement cost relative to 
other strategies. MCKINSEY & CO., PATHWAYS TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY, 
supra. 
 75 Concentrated solar energy is a form of solar energy that uses mirrors to 
concentrate sunlight to generate heat to drive a turbine to generate electricity.  
Concentrating Solar Power, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/solar/printable_versions/csp_program.html (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2010).  Production costs have dipped to such surprisingly low 
levels—they could be as little as seven cents per kilowatt-hour—that 
concentrated solar power has become as cheap as or cheaper than the more 
conventional solar power from photovoltaics.  Southwest Concentrating Solar 
Power 1000-MW Initiative, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., 
http://www.nrel.gov/csp/1000mw_initiative html (last visited Nov. 18, 2010); 
see also Kevin Bullis, Cheap, Superefficient Solar, TECH. REV. (Nov. 9, 2006), 
http://www.technologyreview.com/energy/17774/page1/ (reporting that the 
technology could soon make solar power as cheap as electricity from the grid). 
 76 “Adaptation” is a general term used to describe all forms of adjustment to 
a climate-changed world that societies undertake, both now and in the future.  
For example, building sea walls is a way of adapting to higher sea levels, and has 
been frequently discussed as a way of protecting New York City from sea level 
rises.  See, e.g., Climate Change Initiatives, PLANYC 2030, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/html/plan/climate_citywide.shtml (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2010).  For a general discussion of adaptation, see, HENSON, 
supra note 16, at 299. 
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for undertaking costly (and, in light of the free-riding problem, 
potentially useless) mitigation measures.77  Along similar lines, 
“geo-engineering” measures to physically or chemically remove 
greenhouse gases from the Earth’s atmosphere, after they have 
already been released, can be speculative and risky, but offer 
humankind the technologically appealing chance to undo past 
mistakes.78  Both adaptation research and geo-engineering research 
are controversial, in that they have the potential to detract from the 
mitigation mission, and divert resources away from mitigation 
efforts, even undermining international negotiations.  But 
frustration at the pace and general ineffectiveness of international 
negotiations has naturally spawned inquiries about alternative 
ways to address climate change.  Both adaptation and geo-
engineering also change the way that countries view damages.  
Both may, if effective and if the costs were even remotely 
ascertainable, serve as a “backstop” for climate damages, in much 
the same way that the cost of alternative energy sources place an 
upper bound on the amount of money that could reasonably be 
spent on reducing emissions from coal combustion.  As will be 
shown later, both may also reduce the incentives for strategic 
behavior. 
7. Mitigation costs are minimized by coordinated early action.  
Even apart from the free-riding problem, early mitigation by only 
one country is more costly because it loses opportunities to 
undertake early coordinated action to reduce emissions and 
prepare a capital stock for transition into a less greenhouse gas-
intensive economy.  There is no doubt that efforts to innovate to 
reduce emissions that are undertaken globally will be more 
effective than those undertaken by some smaller subset of 
countries.  Research and development efforts funded and 
supported by more governments and staffed by engineers and 
 
 77 A related argument has been made that mitigation and adaptation are 
strategies that compete for finite funds, and that some adaptation measures are 
potentially more cost-effective in saving lives.  For a discussion of these 
arguments, see INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 754–56 (2007). 
 78 “Geo-engineering” is a general term used to describe a wide variety of 
measures aimed at reducing the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases, 
post-combustion or post-release, sometimes by directly removing greenhouse 
gases from the atmosphere, or reducing the amount of solar radiation that reaches 
the Earth.  For a general discussion of geo-engineering, see HENSON, supra, note 
16, at 330–32, and discussion infra in text accompanying notes 126–127. 
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scientists from more countries stand a better chance of finding 
breakthroughs than those of a smaller group of countries.  Some 
research and development efforts might benefit from economies of 
scale in research and development.  For example, carbon capture 
and storage technology is not, at this time, considered a very cost-
effective emissions reduction measure.79  However, research 
undertaken in which research costs are shared among several 
countries offers the potential to achieve some research and 
development economies of scale.  Hence, the U.S., a country that 
generates about half of its electricity from coal-fired power 
plants,80 has entered into joint carbon capture development and 
other research agreements with China,81 another country heavily 
invested in coal combustion.82  Further, coordination in mitigation 
efforts makes for larger and more competitive markets for 
mitigation technologies.  A recent global glut in the supply of solar 
photovoltaic panels is not exactly a success story,83 but it 
highlights the global nature of demand for solar photovoltaic 
panels.  This global market has only been made possible with some 
joint action among a number of countries, including China, in 
promoting the installation of solar photovoltaic panels.  These and 
other gains from coordination produce reductions in mitigation 
costs.  Conversely, a lack of coordination is more costly. 
8. International climate negotiations and mitigation actions 
take place over many time periods.  Finite and infinite repeated 
games are nothing new to game theory, but the complexity of 
strategic interactions inherent in international climate negotiations 
poses tractability challenges for the modeler.  Casual models of 
 
 79 See MCKINSEY & CO., PATHWAYS TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY, supra 
note 74. 
 80 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY NOVEMBER 2010, 
at 15 tbl.1.1 (2010), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/ 
epm_sum html. 
 81 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, U.S.-China Clean Energy 
Announcements (Nov. 17, 2009), available at http://www.energy.gov/news2009/ 
8292 htm) (also announcing “partnerships” with China in developing other 
technologies and strategies). 
 82 China Overview/Data, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/China/Coal.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2010) 
(“Coal makes up 71 percent of China’s total primary energy consumption, and 
China is both the largest consumer and producer of coal in the world.”). 
 83 Therese Poletti, Solar Industry Seeing a Big Glut, MARKET WATCH (Aug. 
13, 2009), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/solar-panel-glut-may-lead-to-
more-price-implosion-2009-08-13. 
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climate negotiations are reduced to a simple, static prisoner’s 
dilemma problem,84 which captures the collective action problem 
but not the intertemporal effects of actions.85  Most importantly in 
modeling climate negotiations, there is no acknowledgement 
inherent in the prisoner’s dilemma that a cooperative outcome 
could be reached if parties are permitted to signal an intent to 
cooperate to each other.  Serendipitously, the nature of the global 
climate change problem is such that a communication of that sort, 
which could consist of a costly commitment to reduce emissions, 
could also have the effect of lowering future mitigation costs for 
everybody.  An early mitigation measure would thus serve the dual 
purpose of lowering future mitigation costs, and transmitting a 
signal about intent to mitigate in the future.  Above all, this early-
stage action of commitment is what is most effective in recruiting 
participation into multilateral or bilateral negotiations. 
9. International climate change negotiations defy traditional 
game-theoretic labels.  The complexity of international climate 
negotiations is such that it is difficult to characterize using labels 
traditionally relied upon by game theoreticians to determine model 
structure.  While computational limitations in modeling usually 
constrain many-player games to static games, the complexity of 
climate change requires that it be modeled as a dynamic process. 
Information asymmetries suggest that perhaps climate 
negotiations should be modeled as a dynamic game of incomplete 
information,86 and perhaps that a signaling model be used to model 
relationships between potentially cooperating countries.87  After 
all, it has been said often in the course of international climate 
negotiations that there is a tremendous amount of mutual mistrust 
among negotiating parties.88  A mutual suspicion and pessimism as 
 
 84 See, e.g., SANDLER, supra note 9, at 224. 
 85 For an example of a model that does consider intertemporal effects, see 
Shi-Ling Hsu, What IS a Tragedy of the Commons? Overfishing and the 
Campaign Spending Problem, 69 ALB. L. REV. 75 (2005) (modeling the tragedy 
of the commons as an extensive-form game). 
 86 A leading treatise on applied game theory is by Robert Gibbons.  ROBERT 
GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 173–232 (1992) (discussing 
dynamic games of incomplete information). 
 87 For a description of signaling models, see id. at 183–209. 
 88 Peter Baker, Poorer Nations Reject a Target on Emission Cut, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 9, 2009, at A1 (““They’re saying, ‘We just don’t trust you guys,’” said 
Alden Meyer, of the Union of Concerned Scientists. “It’s the same gridlock we 
had last year when Bush was president.””). 
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to the ability of the other to navigate its respective domestic 
political landscapes to enact meaningful greenhouse gas emissions 
regulation is one source of mistrust.  If that were the animating 
feature of climate negotiations, then a signaling model might be 
appropriate.  In such a model, countries would have the 
opportunity to signal to each other that they are of a particular 
type—the mitigating type—and this would reassure other countries 
that early mitigation would be met with reciprocal mitigation, not 
free-riding.  However, models of information asymmetry require 
substantial simplification of payoff structures, such that the costs 
and benefits of strategic climate choices cannot be adequately 
represented in a pure signaling game.  This Article takes the 
approach of firstly modeling negotiations as a process with perfect 
information, and then relaxing that assumption to see what effect 
signaling has on the potential outcomes.  This is done in Part 
V.A.1. 
III. A PROPOSED MODEL 
This Article proposes to begin with a simple model.  The 
model is a two-player, three-period game of perfect information: 
two periods in which the players elect to undertake or not 
undertake mitigation measures to reduce greenhouse gases, and a 
third in which the countries will suffer damages from climate 
change if mitigation efforts in the first two periods are 
unsuccessful.  The players move simultaneously in period one and 
again in period two, and the costs of mitigation in period two 
depend upon how much mitigation is undertaken in period one. 
The proposed model begins with the assumption of perfect 
information.  This is not a realistic assumption; as far as public 
policy and international relations is concerned, the problem of 
climate change is host to an unprecedented collection of 
uncertainties—scientific uncertainties about the effects of climate 
change and the timelines of those effects, uncertainty with respect 
to damages from climate change, uncertainty over how nations will 
react to climate change, uncertainty over the internal political 
dynamics of climate change in every country, and a host of other 
unknowns.  However, attempting to incorporate these uncertainties 
at the outset of a modeling exercise is bound to end in failure.  The 
approach taken in this Article is to begin with an assumption of 
perfect information, and to relax that assumption so as to see how 
outcomes change.  This approach loses some resolution, and loses 
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the ability to model interrelationships among some uncertainties, 
but still offers the possibility of some qualitative analysis.  With 
the heated (for academics) debate among Stern and Nordhaus and 
others over just one parameter—the discount rate—seeming to 
play itself without resolution, it seems unproductive to attempt to 
nail down precise relationships in quantitative terms.  The raw 
state of climate policy would benefit from a simpler analysis. 
A. The Parties 
The two players in this model are labeled as the U.S. and 
China.  There are several reasons for this.  First, they are the two 
largest greenhouse gas-emitting countries, together representing 
over 40 percent of the world’s current annual carbon dioxide 
emissions.89  Both of these two countries are absolutely essential to 
a meaningful attempt to curb emissions.  Both countries have 
expressed a fear of jeopardizing economic growth and risking the 
loss of economic and industrial competitiveness that would 
supposedly accompany greenhouse gas reduction efforts.90  They 
are two countries that are central to the debate over what to do 
about climate change. 
Second, the U.S. and China aptly represent the divide between 
the developed world and the developing world in their greenhouse 
gas emissions profile, their economic ambitions, and their ideas on 
 
 89 In 2008, the entire world emitted a total of 29,381 megatons of carbon 
dioxide. China emitted 6,550 megatons of carbon dioxide, and the U.S. emitted 
5,595.92 megatons, accounting for a total of 41.3 percent.  INT’L ENERGY 
AGENCY, 2010 KEY WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS 48, 56 (2010), available at 
http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2010/key_stats_2010.pdf. 
 90 See, e.g., GOP: US Should Reject Climate Pact, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 12, 
2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/politics/2010488118_apclimaterepu 
blicans html; PEOPLE’S REP. OF CHINA, NAT’L DEV. & REFORM COMM’N, 
CHINA’S NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMME 19 (2007), available at 
http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/CCChina/UpFile/File188.pdf (“The 
development history and trend of various countries has revealed the obvious 
positive correlations between per capita CO2 emissions, per capita commercial 
energy consumption and the economic development level. In other words, with 
current level of technology development, to reach the development level of the 
industrialized countries, it is inevitable that per capita energy consumption and 
CO2 emissions will reach a fairly high level. In the development history of 
human beings, there is no precedent where a high per capita GDP is achieved 
with low per capita energy consumption.”); cf. Jonathan B. Wiener, Climate 
Change Policy and Policy Change in China, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1805, 1817 n.38 
(2008) (describing China’s focus on resolving tensions between economic 
growth and factors such as pollution). 
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wealth redistribution.  The U.S., like most developed countries, is 
primarily interested in obtaining universal agreement on country-
specific limits on greenhouse gas emissions and setting them to 
some historical baseline;91 China, like most developing countries, 
is interested in linking greenhouse gas reduction with global 
wealth redistribution, setting emissions rights on a per capita basis, 
and/or linking responsibilities with historical emissions.92  So, as 
the two players in this game, the U.S. and China serve as proxies 
for developed and developing countries, the two most important 
groups of interests that have clashed in the international climate 
context. 
Finally, the U.S. and China have, in fact, at times held 
discussions as if they were the only two countries that needed to 
reach agreement on greenhouse gas emissions reductions.  
Certainly, they are the most important two, and an argument can 
be made that the U.S. and China could make a bilateral 
arrangement and then use their combined economic, political, and 
 
 91 The U.S. proposal at the Copenhagen meetings was to reduce its emissions 
by 2020 to 17 percent below its 2005 levels, highlighting a dispute with 
Europeans that have insisted on maintaining 1990 as the baseline year as the 
Kyoto Protocol has done.  See Press Release, The White House, President to 
Attend Copenhagen Climate Talks: Administration Announces U.S. Emission 
Target for Copenhagen (Nov. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-attend-copenhagen-
climate-talks (discussing the U.S. proposal to reduce emissions in 2020 to 17 
percent below 2005 levels).  For a discussion of how the U.S. proposal conflicts 
with the European Union proposal, see Malcolm Dowden, Posting to LexisNexis 
Communities Environmental Law and Climate Change Community (Nov. 30, 
2009, 3:19 PM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/environmental-
climatechangelaw/blogs/topstories/archive/2009/11/30/copenhagen_3a00_-the-
_1820_base-year_1920_-debate.aspx; see also Todd Stern, Special Envoy for 
Climate Change, Press Briefing at the United States Mission (Dec. 15, 2009) 
(transcript available at http://geneva.usmission.gov/2009/12/15/climate-change-
dec15/). 
 92 PEOPLE’S REP. OF CHINA, NAT’L DEV. & REFORM COMM’N, supra note 90, 
at 2 (“As noted by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (hereinafter referred to as UNFCCC), the largest share of historical and 
current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated from developed 
countries, while per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively 
low and the share of global emissions originating from developing countries will 
grow to meet their social and development needs.  The UNFCCC stipulates 
clearly that the Parties to the Convention shall protect the climate system for the 
benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity 
and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities, and accordingly, the developed country Parties shall take 
the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”). 
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military clout to coerce the rest of the world into falling in line.  
Such a bilateral-first approach would at least have the advantage of 
avoiding the cumbersome (and heretofore ineffective) 
multinational process implicit in the UNFCCC.  At least, a 
cooperative outcome between the U.S. and China would be an 
important first step towards achieving multilateral agreement on 
emissions reductions.  Agreement between the U.S. and China 
could be the foundation on which a multilateral agreement is built 
from the ground up.93 
B. Modeling Mitigation Costs and Damages 
This model is an attempt to simulate the consequences of 
current and near-future actions based on projections of future costs 
and benefits.  The model consists of three time periods. 
 In the first period, the countries simultaneously decide 
whether to undertake Early Mitigation, or “EM”, to reduce 
greenhouse gases.  Relating this to real-life policy (but not 
in the proposed model), EM corresponds to current or near-
term mitigation policies, those undertaken within the next 
five years. 
 In the second period, the countries simultaneously decide 
whether or not to undertake Late Mitigation, or “LM”, to 
reduce greenhouse gases.  In the real-life world, LM 
corresponds to longer-term mitigation policies, those 
undertaken in ten to forty years. 
 In the third period, countries will suffer very long-term 
damages from climate change if mitigation measures are 
unsuccessful.  The very long-term corresponds to events 
taking place more than forty years from now. 
This model builds in highly stylized numbers to represent 
non-discounted mitigation costs.  For EM, mitigation costs in 
period one are assumed arbitrarily to be 1 for each country 
undertaking them.  EM by just one country is assumed to be 
equally effective no matter which country undertakes it, and is 
assumed to benefit both countries.94  Non-discounted mitigation 
costs in period two are again, for illustrative purposes, chosen 
 
 93 This idea has, as far as the author is aware, only been suggested in a novel 
by Matthew Glass.  MATTHEW GLASS, ULTIMATUM 49–51 (2009). 
 94 This is consistent with the model’s treatment of free-riding discussed infra 
in Part IV(c). 
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somewhat arbitrarily to be multiples of period one mitigation 
costs: 
a)  2  if both countries mitigated in period one, 
b)  4  if only one country mitigated in period one, and 
c)  6  if neither country mitigated in period one. 
This mitigation cost structure is meant to reflect the modeling 
challenges discussed above that pertain to: (1) how early actions 
affect later mitigation costs and (2) how coordination of action 
affects mitigation costs.  Consistent with economic projections, 
non-discounted LM costs are assumed to be lowest when both 
countries undertake EM, higher when only one country undertakes 
EM, and highest when neither country undertakes EM.  Again, the 
intuition behind these assumptions is simple: the less that is done 
in the near term to reduce emissions and convert economies into 
lower-carbon economies, the more expensive it will be to do so in 
the long term.  And, for the reasons discussed above, if either 
country fails to undertake EM, then LM costs will be greater, for 
both countries. 
It is worth emphasizing again that these mitigation costs are 
represented by highly stylized numbers.  I have assumed that 
mitigation costs can be modeled using the simplest set of numbers 
to highlight some non-obvious results.  And again, it is worth 
emphasizing that discounting may change the payoffs, such that a) 
is not necessarily better than b), which is not necessarily better 
than c), which is not even necessarily better than a climate-
changed world.  Again, the objective of this modeling exercise is 
to produce a descriptive account of the strategic dynamics of 
international climate negotiations, not a normative case for early 
mitigation. 
C. Free-riding 
This model makes the critical assumption that both countries 
must undertake LM in order for the world to avoid climate change 
(without geo-engineering).  If either country fails to undertake LM, 
all mitigation measures in either period will have been futile, and 
both countries will have to absorb the full costs of a climate-
changed world.  This strong assumption is derived from warnings 
from the Stern Review that, as discussed above, countries are 
unlikely to be able to successfully mitigate the effects of climate 
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change alone.95  In essence, this model assumes that as between the 
two players, any free-riding in the second (LM) period would 
defeat efforts to avoid climate change. 
Game-theoretic models to date illustrate the powerful effect of 
free-riding.  William Nordhaus’s RICE model (Regional Integrated 
Model of Climate and the Economy)96 and the WITCH model 
(World Induced Technical Change Hybrid model),97 the two main 
economic game-theoretic models of climate negotiations, both 
conclude that free-riding is of central importance.  In the WITCH 
model, free-riding plays an almost determinative role in whether 
countries can successfully cooperate to achieve an optimal 
mitigation path.  Bosetti et al. find that in cases of substantial non-
participation, leading to substantial leakage of fossil fuel 
combustion, the costs of mitigation for those countries mitigating 
become astronomically high—as much as $2000 per ton of CO2.98  
This price is a reflection of the difficulty faced by a mitigating 
country trying not only to curb its own emissions, but also to 
compensate for the fact that other non-mitigating countries are 
busily undoing all of the emissions reductions achieved by 
mitigation. 
Both the Nordhaus and WITCH models involve large 
numbers of players—twelve “regions” of the world each 
comprising countries with similar economic and emissions 
profiles—such that cooperation is extremely difficult to achieve.  
And because both of these models assume that there can be no 
incentives to join a cooperating coalition of regions (such as trade 
sanctions against non-joiners), the only incentives to cooperate 
consist of the slightly better chance of avoiding climate change, an 
increment that is minimized by free-riding.  Moreover, the WITCH 
model assumes that free-riding behavior would be non-orthogonal 
to mitigation measures; because mitigation measures are likely to 
reduce the global price of fossil fuels, the model builds in an 
assumption that the greater the mitigation, the greater the free-
riding.99  It should surprise no one that the prospects of 
cooperation to avoid climate change are bleak under these models. 
 
 95 See STERN REVIEW, supra note 1, at 450–65. 
 96 Nordhaus & Yang, supra, note 10. 
 97 See supra note 52. 
 98 Bosetti et al., supra note 52, at 27. 
 99 Id. at 9–14. 
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The simplifying assumption in the model proposed in this 
article that free-riding would absolutely preclude cooperation and 
avoidance of climate change is meant to make free-riding 
exogenous and sidestep modeling it.  This is not to deny that as a 
descriptive matter, free-riding is endogenous and increases with 
mitigation efforts.  But the purpose of this model is to isolate 
certain factors that might advance cooperation, even in the face of 
potential free-riding. 
A second reason for exogenizing the free-riding problem is 
that no matter how daunting the problem, each country must still 
make decisions on greenhouse gas mitigation that serve its own 
population, and to some extent exogenize considerations of what 
other countries are doing.  To repeat for emphasis a condition 
stated above, in order for there to be cooperation, every country 
will have to accept that their cooperation is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition to avoiding the most severe climate change 
effects.  Given sufficient exigency, countries must make that 
probabilistic determination without the luxury of resenting the 
possibility that others will defect; given the stakes, countries must 
eventually put aside questions of fairness and make a decision that 
maximizes their own welfare, even if it results in the unjust 
enrichment of others. 
D. Discounting 
Future payoffs are discounted in this model. Each country has 
a specific discount rate.  A number of considerations are packed 
into the discount rate in this model.  In addition to the purely 
economic sense in which a discount rate operates, this model 
assumes that a country-specific discount rate also embodies a 
preference for delay because of the possibility of technological 
learning that reduces future mitigation costs, as well as future 
adaptation costs.  WITCH and other integrated assessment models 
separate out technological learning as a factor that affects the 
timing of mitigation decisions.  This model wraps technological 
learning into the discount rate, as in rough terms, the effect would 
be the same: to make delayed action more economically attractive 
than near-term action. 
As noted above, modeling political actors such as climate 
negotiators requires the utilization of not just a traditional 
economic discount rate, but a political one—the rate at which 
decisionmakers discount future costs and benefits while making 
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present decisions.  Apart from the purely economic reasons to 
discount, it would be naïve to think that climate negotiators would 
weight the welfare of future citizens of their country as highly as 
they weight those of their current constituents.  In fact, it seems 
adventurous to assume that political actors with electoral pressures 
make decisions that are as generous to future generations as an 
economic discount rate would have it.  In other words, a discount 
rate used to model political decisions by governments would, as a 
descriptive matter, probably be higher than a purely economic one. 
This model assumes a country-specific discount rate only over 
the three time periods in the model, and not, like the WITCH 
model or other integrated assessment models, over fifty to one 
hundred years and in small increments.  Second period mitigation 
costs are discounted at its country-specific rate, and third period 
damages are doubly discounted.  The discount rate in this model is 
thus not meant to represent a discount rate that is expressed in 
annual terms, as discount rates often are.  In the model, 
discounting is expressed as discount factors, such that a discount 
factor x is expressed as (1-r)n where r is the discount rate and n is 
the number of years.  For simplicity, the three periods are assumed 
to be spaced evenly apart, so that n is assumed the same between 
periods one and two as it is between periods two and three.  r is 
assumed to be constant.  Discounting payoffs in period two is thus 
accomplished by multiplying by x; discounting payoffs in period 
three is accomplished by multiplying by x2. 
E. Damages from Climate Change 
In this model, damages from climate change are depicted as A 
for the U.S. and B for China.  Each country perceives its own 
damages, and that these perceived costs could change over time, as 
they seem to have in recent years in both the U.S. and China.  
Country-specific damages from climate change are of course 
highly uncertain.  And obviously, it is not just the very long term 
in which many projected climate change impacts will be 
manifest.100  But the most serious impacts occur in this long time 
 
 100 An extensive federal interagency review of the impacts of climate change 
has concluded that the impacts of global climate change are already being felt in 
the U.S.  U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2009), available at 
http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf. 
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frame, and this model best captures the nature of the intertemporal 
tradeoffs by separating out time periods for mitigation, which 
occur in periods one and two, and for damages, which occur in 
period three. 
The simplest conception of climate change damages imagines 
them as those costs that are incurred as a direct or indirect result of 
the effects of climate change.  They may include, for example, 
rescue and relief efforts incurred from more severe tropical storms 
(over and above those that would have occurred anyway), damages 
to the agricultural sector from regional shortages of water due to 
climate change, and damages to cities that find themselves, in a 
climate-changed world, below sea level.  More ambitious 
conceptions of climate change should take into account the 
likelihood that positive feedback effects may amplify and/or 
accelerate the effects of climate change.101  The possibility that the 
dangers of climate change have been underestimated because the 
small climate changes already caused will beget other greenhouse 
gas releases, and further climate change, is alarming but as of yet 
hard to evaluate.  Should A or B (U.S. and China damages, 
respectively) include the expected value of the possibility of 
positive feedback and catastrophic effects?  They might well not, 
given the very uncertain projections surrounding the possibility of 
catastrophic effects.  But Weitzman’s warning about the cost-
benefit analyses that either ignore or falsely purport to account for 
catastrophic outcomes suggests substantial caution is warranted.102  
Obviously, a huge range of potential effects are possible, and there 
are no doubt a number of currently unforeseen effects that would 
add to the costs.  For now, a simple model is proposed and a set of 
unique solutions derived. 
F. Finally, the Model 
Given the modeling assumptions described above, the model, 
a game of perfect information, is set out in extensive form in 
Figure 1 below.  The players move simultaneously in period one 
and in period two.  The payoffs of the U.S. and China are derived 
from the sum of the mitigation costs (set out in Part IV.B. above) 
and damages from climate change, if it occurs.  These are observed 
in period one, so period two payoffs are discounted (multiplied by 
 
 101 See generally Torn & Harte, supra note 13. 
 102 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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corresponding to different permutations of whether the countries 
undertake EM or not.  Second, subgames A, B, and C have only 
one stable Nash equilibrium,103 and subgame D has two, so that 
there are only five possible outcomes: 
1. Both U.S. and China do EM and both do LM. 
2. U.S. does EM, but China does not, then both do LM. 
3. China does EM, but U.S. does not, then both do LM. 
4. Neither U.S. nor China does EM, but both do LM. 
5. Neither U.S. nor China does EM or LM, and climate 
change occurs. 
This winnowing-down of outcomes is possible because first, 
no Nash equilibrium could involve just one party doing LM.  
Under perfect information, each player would know in advance 
whether the other was going to do LM.  Since both players must do 
LM in order to prevent climate change, there is no point in one 
country undertaking LM if it knows the other will not.  Second, 
either player doing EM implies a cooperative Nash equilibrium, 
because under perfect information the parties would know in 
advance whether cooperation was possible; if it was impossible, 
then neither party would bother with EM.  Hence, subgames A, B, 
and C, in which at least one player undertakes EM, have a unique 
cooperative Nash equilibrium, and subgame D in which neither 
player undertakes EM has two possible Nash equilibria: a 
cooperative Nash equilibrium and a non-cooperative outcome 
resulting in climate change. 
It is illustrative to consider subgame D and observe the 
conditions under which doing EM would appear to be inefficient 
and also when non-cooperation (and suffering damages from 
climate change) is efficient.  First, consider the possibility that 
both the U.S. and China would prefer to avoid climate change 
damages (perceive a very high A and B, respectively), but both 
have a high enough discount rate that they prefer only LM (have a 
low x and y respectively).  Taking a look at the payoffs for the U.S. 
(the Chinese analysis would obviously be identical), this would 
mean that the U.S. prefers the payoff of outcome 4 to outcome 2 
and outcome 5 (outcomes 1 and 3 are not possible because China 
 
 103 In its simplest form, a Nash equilibrium is an outcome whereby each 
player in a game pursues a strategy that is the best strategy given every other 
player’s best strategy.  It is an equilibrium, because there is no incentive for any 
player to deviate from his strategy.  GIBBONS, supra note 86, at 8. 
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will not do EM): 
-6x > -1-4x  and -6x > -Ax2 
or, in other words: 
x < ½  and Ax > 6104 
So if Ax > 6  and  By > 6, but also  x < 1/4  and  y < 1/4, and 
if both countries believe these conditions to hold, then a 
cooperative Nash equilibrium would be one in which both the U.S. 
and China eschew EM, but both do LM—the result of both 
countries being sufficiently concerned about the damages of 
climate change, but also both countries having high discount rates. 
The differences between outcomes 1 through 4, all of which 
end in cooperation, also illustrate one important role of the two-
stage mitigation process.  Why not combine EM and LM?  
Separating out EM from LM in two separate periods is important 
for a number of reasons, but foremost among them is the 
illustration of how different parameters for different countries may 
alter the allocation of the burden of mitigation across countries or 
across time.  Also, the most interesting results from the model are 
derived when the perfect information assumption is relaxed (Part 
IV.A), and period one actions and inactions explicitly affect the 
decision environment for period two. 
A unique solution thus exists for each set of values of A, B, x 
and y.105  Conceptually, cooperative Nash equilibria occur for 
higher values of Ax or By or both, and higher values of discount 
factors x and y or both.  The outcomes of this simple game are 
mapped in Figure 2.  The conditions are formally derived in 
Appendix A.  Boundary conditions are omitted, so only 
inequalities are analyzed.  It seems sufficient for illustrative 
purposes to assume that cooperative Nash equilibria are unstable 
unless the conditions are strictly satisfied. 
 
 104 Again, the 6 is just an arbitrarily chosen mitigation cost for LM with 
neither party doing EM.  To put numbers to this exercise, if x=1/6, then -6x = -1.  
Recall that the payoff of the U.S. doing both LM and EM (assuming that China 
also does EM and LM) is -1-2x, so the U.S. payoff is -1-2/6 = -4/3.  Recall that 
the payoff of U.S. doing LM but not EM (assuming that China does the same) is 
-6x, so the U.S. payoff is -1.  Assuming China does the same as the U.S., the 
U.S. has a higher payoff only doing LM. 
 105 An exception to this exists in the form of an unstable cooperative Nash 
equilibrium.  The exception involves low discount factors (high discount rates), 
and illustrates a classic prisoners’ dilemma in that a socially optimal cooperation 
is foiled by individually optimal self-interest.  This is derived in Appendix A. 
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IV. Modifying the Game-Theoretic Model 
It is important to keep in mind the purpose of modeling 
behavior under an assumption of perfect information.  It is not as if 
there is suspense in stage 2; the point of modeling is to illustrate 
how differences in parameter values—in this game the perceptions 
of damages and the discount rates—affect the distribution of costs 
and the sequence of moves by each player.  The model under 
perfect information simply illustrates the relationships between 
pieces of information. 
That said, if this article ended here, the reader would be 
justified in complaining that the proposed model explains little, 
especially given the somewhat arbitrary choices of mitigation 
costs.  The model is useful, however, as a baseline for showing 
what happens to the probability of a cooperative outcome once the 
assumptions are relaxed.  That is, what this model can illustrate 
about international climate negotiations can be gleaned by 
perturbing various aspects of the model and seeing what happens 
to the likelihood of a cooperative outcome.  What follows is a 
series of modeling perturbations, with accompanying lessons about 
climate negotiations. 
A. Imperfect Information: Uncertainty and Strategic Behavior 
As acknowledged earlier, the greatest leap of this model is the 
assumption of perfect information.  Much of the difficulty and 
shenanigans swirling about the climate change public policy 
problem can be traced to the fact that many pieces of information 
are uncertain—scientific, economic, and political.  In the first part 
of this Part, the perfect information assumption is relaxed and the 
effect of uncertainty is explored.  As well, uncertainty in all its 
forms gives rise to the possibility of strategic behavior, which is 
discussed in a second subpart to this Part. 
Uncertainty negatively affects prospects for a cooperative 
outcome.  The reason for this is that cooperation in this model is a 
joint product.  Given that this model adopts a cost-benefit decision 
framework, and given that mitigating greenhouse gases is only 
rational if others mitigate, it is not only important to understand 
one’s own costs and benefits, it is vitally important to understand 
the costs and benefits of other countries.  If one country perceives 
that another country’s cost-benefit analysis would disfavor 
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mitigation, then it would have reason to believe that cooperation is 
doomed; under those circumstances, it would be irrational to 
mitigate.  Uncertainty can have a devastating effect on the 
prospects for cooperation. 
1. Uncertainty 
There are a variety of ways that uncertainty can wreak havoc 
in climate policymaking and international relations.  For example, 
scientific uncertainty inherent in climate change seems to have 
produced psychological responses that challenge assumptions of 
rationality.  Psychologists and enlightened economists have long 
understood that people make poor decisions under uncertainty.  
When faced with the task of weighing certain information against 
uncertain information, people systemically overweigh the certain 
information.106  Thus, when faced with a choice of certain 
mitigation costs and uncertain damages from climate change, 
humans will be inclined to bias towards the former.  In a sense, the 
manipulation of public opinion by those opposed to climate change 
is merely a scaling-up of a human propensity to make, on an 
individual level, mistakes in judgment that involve uncertain 
information.  In the context of this game, which naively assumes a 
simple cost-benefit calculation, scientific uncertainty clearly biases 
decisions against mitigation, and towards delay.  These 
uncertainties also exacerbate the collective action problems of 
negotiating climate agreements.107 
Uncertainty also raises the possibility that parties could signal 
future intentions to each other, since imperfect information renders 
future actions probabilistic.  The mitigation cost structures 
assumed by the model under perfect information already build in a 
considerable amount of information about potential future paths.  
The fact that LM costs more, the less EM is undertaken, means 
that failure by either player or both players to undertake EM 
creates a world in which a cooperative outcome can occur in a 
narrower set of possible combinations of values of A, B, x, and y.  
This does, in fact, reflect what most economists will say about 
 
 106 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decisions Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979); see also Amos 
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974) (discussing the effects of various heuristics 
when making judgments in the face of uncertainty). 
 107 See SANDLER, supra note 9, at 224. 
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EM: a little bit now could save a lot later; so much so that doing 
nothing now forecloses a number of future options.108 
But even apart from the hard path-dependencies created as 
part of the structure of the game, undertaking EM must also, in the 
real world of international relations, mean something else: it must 
signal a turn, political or social, representing a commitment to 
some different path.  EM in this real world, then, has more than 
just an economic consequence for the future; it has the effect of 
irrevocably committing some resources to mitigating greenhouse 
gas emissions, and signaling the possibility of reciprocity should 
another party make a similar or greater commitment.  Of course, 
political decisions can be undone and social movements can 
reverse themselves.  But the nature of a costly and necessarily 
long-term commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions means 
that there will be political costs should a future administration 
renege on these commitments.109  This is important information to 
other interested countries. 
For example, consider China’s rapid deployment of coal-fired 
power plants.110  Because it is so costly to retire these plants, this 
current emphasis on coal-fired electricity production has very 
significant long-term implications.  The U.S. could be forgiven for 
doubting that China would undertake any future mitigation in the 
form of reducing electricity-related greenhouse gas emissions.  
There are, of course, a number of other things that China could do 
twenty to forty years from now that might amount to late 
mitigation, but it is hard to avoid interpreting such a breakneck 
pace of construction of coal-fired power plants as a prioritization 
of economic development over climate concerns. 
As for the United States, consider the wavering prospects of 
climate law—federal and state legislation, as well as the occasional 
dramatic development in climate litigation—and consider how 
these twists and turns affect the decision environments of any 
country considering greenhouse gas mitigation.  Supporters have 
 
 108 See supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text. 
 109 For an economic game-theoretic model of the costs of breaking 
commitments to reduce greenhouse gases, and how these affect international 
negotiations, see Ana Espinola-Arredondo, Free-Riding and Cooperation in 
Environmental Games, 11 J. PUBL. ECON. THEORY 119 (2009). 
 110 As of 2007, China was adding coal-fired power plants capacity each year 
that was comparable to the entire grid supply of the United Kingdom.  MASS. 
INST. TECH., supra note 74, at ix. 
HSU MACRO 3RD DOC 1/23/2012  1:10:47 AM 
2011] GAME THEORY AND CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS 57 
emphasized what it would mean to the international community if 
the U.S. Congress passed anything that commits to greenhouse gas 
reductions.  Of course, legislation and even case law can be 
undone by future administrations and courts.  But every case and 
every piece of legislation creates its own expectations, and 
therefore creates its own stickiness.  This would have been 
particularly true of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 
2009 (the Waxman-Markey Bill) that passed the House of 
Representatives, had it become law.  In financing the political 
support needed to make an expensive transition to a lower-carbon 
economy, the authors of the bill have doled out considerable 
benefits to a variety of industries.  After an unprecedented 
lobbying effort,111 the bill’s cap-and-trade program wound up 
including a stream of free emissions allowances worth an 
estimated $378 billion (in present value terms) to a Christmas list 
of powerful industries.112  Many have been critical of the rents that 
have been distributed in closed-door negotiating sessions, as well 
as the bill’s scaled-down ambitions.113  It is worth keeping in mind, 
however, that if the bill ultimately became law, it would be 
difficult for the United States to retreat in the future, especially 
given the vested industry interests that would have been the 
beneficiary of Representatives Waxman and Markey’s generosity.  
This would be an important signal to the rest of the world. 
Under uncertainty, then, actions in period one play important 
dual Bayesian roles.  First, they provide information about how a 
country perceives its damages from climate change and/or its 
discount rate (as conceived in this game).  Second, the path 
dependencies created by political decisions to commit resources 
(and the social currents that underlie these decisions) to mitigating 
greenhouse gas emissions are such that there is at least some 
political and economic permanence attached to these course 
 
 111 It was reported that 1,150 groups lobbied the U.S. Congress in just the 
twelve weeks leading up to passage of Waxman-Markey.  Timothy Gardner, 
Lobbyists Elbow for Influence on U.S. Climate Bill, REUTERS.COM, Aug. 12, 
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/12/us-climate-lobbying-
idUSTRE57B61Y20090812. 
 112 For one of many analyses of the Waxman-Markey bill and the political 
concessions that were made in order to obtain passage, see Hsu, supra note 35. 
 113 See, e.g., James Hansen, G-8 Failure Reflects U.S. Failure on Climate 
Change, HUFFINGTON POST (July 9, 2009, 10:33 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-james-hansen/g-8-failure-reflects-us-
f_b_228597 html. 
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changes.  Both of these types of information may, in a game-
theoretic setting, affect the willingness of other countries to 
undertake LM. 
There is a further significance and importance to uncertainty 
and signaling that is not easily captured by a game-theoretic 
model.  The model in this article only involves two game-playing 
stages—an improvement over earlier static depictions—but what if 
there were many stages, with many pieces of information being 
generated at each stage?  This is in reality what is happening on 
the world stage, as administrations change, as climate science 
develops, and as the discourse and information about climate 
change evolves. 
The discouraging or encouraging effects of early behavior 
such as EM may have a positive feedback effect that amplifies the 
signaling that might be modeled in this game.  Consider again, for 
example, if the United States interprets Chinese construction of 
coal-fired power plants in a very negative way: that China must 
view its risks from climate change to be quite manageable, and is 
therefore dubious about mitigating greenhouse gases.  In a multi-
stage game, a subsequent stage could involve some action (or 
reaction) by the United States that similarly could be interpreted by 
China as retreating from any commitments to mitigate greenhouse 
gas emissions—for example, political developments that signal a 
lower likelihood of passage of federal climate legislation.  Given 
the volatile political relationship between the United States and 
China, this could be a very realistic signal from the United States 
that it, too, is inclined to take its chances with climate change, 
especially if Chinese reluctance to mitigate would render 
American action unilateral and therefore futile.  What would then 
be a Chinese response?  Seeing U.S. hostility and dimming 
prospects for a cooperative outcome on mitigating greenhouse gas 
emissions, it may decide that further retrenchment and further 
savings are in order.  And so on.  What a simple two-stage game 
fails to capture is the possibility of a dynamic unraveling of 
prospects for cooperation.  Some action that could be perceived as 
a negative signal could provoke something that could reasonably 
be perceived as a negative reaction from the other, which would, 
because of the need for cooperation, induce further retreats.  This 
dynamic has been on display often in international climate 
negotiations.  Discussions on implementation of the Copenhagen 
Accord have faltered amid cross-accusations of a lack of 
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commitment to climate policy; U.S. negotiators fault other 
countries for backtracking on commitments made in Copenhagen, 
while other countries point to the failure of the United States 
Senate to pass legislation for casting a pall over negotiations.114 
Conversely, positive action on greenhouse gas mitigation 
could build on itself.  In addition to its investment in coal-fired 
power plants, China has also invested heavily in renewable energy 
technologies, aiming to become a leader in technological 
development in these industries.115  This action seems all the more 
credible as a signal in light of China’s actions to insulate these 
nascent industries from international competition.116  Besides 
being a strategic industrial threat, a U.S. interpretation could also 
view this as a Chinese expectation that energy generation in the 
future will be low-carbon.  Even if this does not explicitly signal 
current Chinese willingness to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 
its investment in a lower-carbon future is a sign that China 
anticipates such a future.  That could be a signal of future Chinese 
acquiescence, since a lower-carbon future would be impossible 
without Chinese acceptance.  That in turn could prompt American 
optimism, and perhaps usher along domestic greenhouse gas 
legislation that promotes U.S. renewable energy research, which 
would further signal to China a U.S. preparation for a lower-
carbon future.  And so on. 
Uncertainty, and the signaling it necessitates, thus carries with 
it heightened consequences.  In an environment of uncertainty with 
respect to the science, politics, and economics of climate change, 
even actions that would otherwise be viewed as inconsequential 
could play important informational roles.  With so much at stake 
and so much uncertainty, the worldwide yearning for information 
would naturally lead to a situation in which a seemingly 
disproportionate amount of attention is paid to so many minor 
events.  Uncertainty about climate change means that knowledge 
about climate change and knowledge about what different 
 
 114 Friedman, supra note 37. 
 115 Lisa Friedman, China Leads Major Countries with $34.6 Billion Invested 
in Clean Technology, CLIMATEWIRE, Mar. 25, 2010, 
http://www.eenews net/features/documents/2010/03/25/document_cw_03.pdf 
(citing THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, WHO’S WINNING THE CLEAN ENERGY 
RACE? (2010)). 
 116 Keith Bradsher, Drawing Critics, China Seeks to Dominate in Renewable 
Energy, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2009, at B1. 
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countries think about climate change is evolving.  A multi-stage 
game illustrates the role of early actions as part of that evolution of 
climate information.  One should not be surprised that in such a 
setting, little things could mean a lot. 
2. Strategic Behavior 
Perhaps even more troubling, scientific uncertainty allows 
posturing to take place within domestic and international debates 
over allocations of burden-sharing.  Economic uncertainty invites 
highly interested parties to produce their own numbers with their 
own opaque assumptions, clouding an already confusing public 
discussion.  Political uncertainties constrain or appear to constrain 
policymakers and negotiators. 
The strategic behavior problem discussed in this part 
illustrates some of the pitfalls of the way that climate negotiations 
have been conducted thus far.  In the international realm, a 
somewhat disingenuous discussion about the “justice” of the 
climate change problem has helped enable domestic and 
international posturing that has masked common interest and 
threatened the stability of international and domestic negotiations.  
There is certainly an appeal to the argument that developed 
countries that have benefitted from the combustion of fossil fuels 
(and therefore mostly created the problem of climate change) 
should assume a higher burden in reducing greenhouse gases.  The 
fact that the Kyoto Protocol set out obligations for developed 
countries but not developing countries117 might reflect this 
understanding.  Most would probably also agree that developed 
countries should also make what amounts to side payments to 
developing countries to assist in their economic development in a 
lower-carbon future, and to assist in adaptation to the effects of 
climate change.118  Were strategic behavior absent from this 
 
 117 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 20. 
 118 As part of the recent Copenhagen climate negotiations, developed 
countries pledged to donate $100 billion per year by 2020 to begin assisting 
developing countries.  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Conference of Parties, Fifteenth Session, Copenhagen, Dec. 7-18, 2009, 
¶ 8, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010).  While the Clean 
Development Mechanism has come under intense criticism for its 
ineffectiveness, as noted supra in text accompanying note 42, the notion that 
development assistance is warranted has remained intact.  Critics of the Clean 
Development Mechanism propose alternative means of financing, rather than 
abandonment of the idea of making side payments to developing countries.  See, 
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process, there would be no overall welfare implications—side 
payments would merely be converting potential Pareto Superior 
moves into Pareto Superior moves.  However, only heroic naïveté 
would entertain such a notion. 
Strategic behavior as modeled in this article also pervades 
domestic negotiations in crafting domestic legislation.  Regulating 
greenhouse gases and transitioning whole economies into a lower-
carbon mode manifestly creates winners and losers.  In both 
domestic and international climate negotiations, side payments will 
clearly be necessary and widespread in order to obtain sufficient 
agreement on mitigating greenhouse gases.  This Article, however, 
will confine itself to the modeling of side payments in the 
international realm.  In modeling the effects of strategic behavior 
and the resulting potential for mischief, this model provides a 
conceptual linkage between the justice discourse119 and the 
consequentialist discourse120 that have grappled for supremacy in 
the climate change debate. 
This model introduces the possibility of side payments by 
allowing side payments to be made in period one, to induce EM 
 
e.g., Wara & Victor, supra note 42, at 6. China has acted as a spokesnation for 
developing nations.  For example, China emphasizes the principle that developed 
countries should take the lead in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. PEOPLE’S 
REP. OF CHINA, NAT’L DEV. & REFORM COMM’N, supra note 90, at 58 
(“According to the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ of 
the UNFCCC, the Parties included in Annex I to the Convention should take the 
lead in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. For developing countries with less 
historical emission and current low per capita emission, their priority is to 
achieve sustainable development.”); see also Copenhagen Climate Talks 
(UNFCCC), N.Y. TIMES, http://topics nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/sub 
jects/u/united_nations_framework_convention_on_climate_change/index html 
(last visited Dec. 18, 2009) (“The Chinese continue to resist mandatory ceilings 
on their emissions. They argue that the developed countries have churned out 
greenhouse gases for decades and should bear a greater burden in reducing them. 
Developing nations, they add, should not be restrained in using economic 
development to raise their standards of living, even if greater emissions result.”). 
 119 For one synthesis of the many, many works on climate justice, see Sonja 
Klinsky & Hadi Dowlatabadi, Conceptualizations of Justice in Climate Policy, 9 
CLIMATE POL’Y 88 (2009).  Domestically, the fairness within countries of certain 
policy measures has featured prominently in the instrument choice literature.  For 
one of several economic analyses of the distributional impacts of different 
greenhouse gas regulatory instruments, see Dallas Burtraw, Richard Sweeney & 
Margaret Walls, The Incidence of U.S. Climate Policy (Sept. 17, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-
09-17.pdf. 
 120 See, e.g., BARRETT, supra note 10; STEWART & WIENER, supra note 23; 
Wiener, supra note 90. 
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and LM, or period two to induce LM only.  The simpler case is a 
side payment in period two to induce the other party to undertake 
LM.  Consider, for example, the following possible scenario: the 
U.S. perceives its damages from climate change to be very high, 
and is willing to undertake LM, but China perceives its damages to 
be low enough that it is only willing to undertake LM in certain 
period two subgames.  Suppose that 
Ax > 6 and  x > 1/2  and 
2 < By < 4  and  y < 1/2 
Given these assumption, the players will enter period 2 in 
subgame B (if  x < 1/2,  the parties would enter subgame D, and 
the analysis would be similar).  In subgame B, the parties would 
both undertake LM (and a cooperative Nash equilibrium is 
reached) if both the U.S. and China have higher payoffs from LM 
than from facing climate change, i.e. if both of the following are 
true: 
-1-4x > -1-Ax2  and  -4y > -By2 
which reduces to the pair of conditions 
Ax > 4  and (1a) 
By > 4  (1b) 
But we have assumed that By > 4, so we know that subgame 
B would ordinarily end with no cooperation.  However, the U.S. 
can make a side payment in the amount of  s  to China so that LM 
becomes worth it.  Adding a side payment  s  into a comparison of 
payoffs in subgame B for the U.S. and China yields 
-1-4x-s  > -1-Ax2  and  -4y+s  > -By2 
which (dividing through by –x and -y) means that 
x
sAx  4  and  (2a) 
y
sBy  4  (2b) 
What this side payment has done is substitute conditions 2a 
and 2b for conditions 1a and 1b, adding in the  s/x  and  s/y  terms 
to create new conditions for a cooperative Nash equilibrium in 
subgame B.  If the side payment is conditioned upon China’s 
undertaking LM, conditions 2a and 2b represent the new test for 
whether cooperation will occur. So if there is an  s  such that, 
starting from the initial assumptions, conditions 2a and 2b can be 
satisfied, then a side payment from the U.S. to China could rescue 
what would otherwise be a doomed effort to cooperate to mitigate 
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greenhouse gas emissions.  The same analysis would apply if the 
parties found themselves in subgame D, only the conditions would 
be more stringent.121 
A side payment could also be made in period one.  In order 
for a side payment to work in period one, however, two conditions 
need to be satisfied, not just one.  Not only must a side payment be 
possible to induce LM by both parties, but the side payment must 
induce the parties to enter a subgame in which LM is induced for 
both parties.  This slightly more complicated derivation is set out 
in Appendix B.  As long as there is perfect information regarding 
all of the parameters, there is no reason that a side payment could 
not convert all potentially Pareto-efficient situations into Pareto-
efficient outcomes. 
The trouble arises, of course, as it does in simple Coasean 
bargaining situations, when there is imperfect information.  
Damages or a country’s perception of its own damages may be 
uncertain, as well as discount rates or a country’s perception of its 
own discount rates.  If, for example, the U.S. is not certain of B or 
y (China’s climate change damages or its discount rate, 
respectively), then failure by China to EM could be interpreted as 
one of four possible things: (1) a signal that China believes its 
climate change damages to be low; (2) a signal that China has a 
high discount rate; (3) both (1) and (2); or (4) strategic behavior in 
the form of a false signal in order to extract a period two side 
payment.  The trick for the country that wants to avoid climate 
change (in this scenario, the U.S.) is to ascertain the real reason 
why China eschews EM, and whether it would later undertake LM.  
For the country that eschews EM (in this scenario China), it may 
stand to gain a benefit in the form of a side payment, even if it 
intended to undertake LM after all. 
If China does undertake strategic behavior, however, it runs a 
risk: instead of extracting a side payment from the U.S. in period 
2, China’s failure to undertake EM in period 1 could cause the 
U.S. to abandon hope of cooperation and simply refuse to 
undertake LM in period 2.  A number of misunderstandings could 
lead to strategic behavior backfiring: China could overestimate  A  
 
 121 The side payment would have to be made so that both the conditions 
x
sAx  6  and
y
sBy  6 would be satisfied. 
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and  x, so that it expects a side payment from the U.S., when in 
fact none would be forthcoming; the U.S. could underestimate  B  
and  y, such that it does not believe it could afford a large enough 
side payment to induce China to LM, when in fact it could; the 
values and understandings of all of the parameters could change 
over time, and failure to EM could have foreclosed options.  
Because EM makes LM cheaper, strategic behavior that involves 
not doing EM could put the parties into a subgame in which LM is 
too expensive, while it might not have been too expensive in a 
different subgame. 
For example, it could also be the case that China assumes 
that: 
Ax > 4  and China knows that for itself  By > 4, 
but that it thinks it can finagle a side payment from the U.S..  
But suppose, in reality: 
4 > Ax > 2, 
and if the U.S. undertook EM and China did not, then the 
parties would be in subgame B, and the U.S. would not, as it 
would have in subgame A, have undertaken LM.  In subgame B, 
Ax  would have to be greater than 4 in order for it to be 
worthwhile, but in subgame A it would only have to have been 
greater than 2 to have been worthwhile.  So by trying to extract a 
side payment out of the U.S., China would have created an 
unnecessarily stringent condition for cooperation, and induced an 
outcome that would be inferior to the one that would have 
occurred if China had not tried to deceive the U.S. 
Whether China and developing nations are truly sincere about 
their demands for side payments is obviously hard to know, 
perhaps even for the Chinese and the developing nations 
themselves.  It could well be true that developing countries truly 
view their climate-change damages as low, given that many of 
them start from a current position of poverty, and climate-related 
damages would not pose a huge loss of wealth as it might for 
wealthy countries.  For the most part, international institutions and 
climate negotiations have acknowledged this dynamic, although 
the degree to which efforts have met the needs of developing 
countries is a subject of intense disagreement.  The Clean 
Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, which provides 
for the issuance of emissions credits for developed countries 
towards meeting their Kyoto targets if they fund an emission-
reducing project in a developing country, was intended to transfer 
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wealth to developing countries. Its success at reducing greenhouse 
gases and aiding those most in need, however, has been called into 
question.122 
The Copenhagen negotiations have picked up where previous 
negotiations have left off.  In the opinion of U.S. climate 
negotiator Jonathan Pershing, a number of countries viewed the 
Copenhagen summit not as a forum for climate change solutions, 
but as a process for wealth redistribution.123  In this regard, 
Copenhagen can not be considered a complete failure from these 
countries’ perspectives: the U.S. announced a commitment at 
Copenhagen to help raise $100 billion to assist developed 
countries with adapting to climate change.124 
Given this kind of uncertainty and a demonstrated propensity 
to seek side payments, it becomes understandable why a country 
might seek to delay mitigation.  Uncertainty may explain some 
current hesitation among developed countries to undertake 
mitigation, as well as what in this game would be considered EM.  
Uncertainty and the potential for mischief through strategic 
behavior can be reduced by waiting until period two.  It is true that 
failing to undertake EM forecloses options, but looking at climate 
negotiations as not just a two-stage game, but a more realistic 
multi-stage game might soften the stark finality of certain 
decisions.  A country looking at a series of annual decisions over 
many years might well trade the loss of options for some better 
information.  In a world where there are multiple opportunities to 
undertake EM, the refusal to undertake EM this year may still be, 
in the eyes of the uncertain beholder, worthwhile—if some 
uncertainty can be reduced in the meantime. 
Delay begins to make even more sense in the presence of 
strategic behavior.  For example, assuming—again, without 
asserting—that in the context of this model, the U.S. were the 
 
 122 For a discussion, see Wara & Victor, supra note 42. 
 123 U.S. Deputy Envoy for Climate Change Jonathan Pershing, Remarks at the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (Jan. 14, 2010) (transcript available 
from E&ETV at http://www.eenews net/tv/transcript/1091) (“. . . Bolivia, 
Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba. These are countries that are a part of the ALBA 
group, a group that sees this process not so much as a solution to climate change, 
but, in fact, as a mechanism to redistribute global wealth.”). 
 124 Lisa Friedman & Darren Samuelson, Hillary Clinton Pledges $100B for 
Developing Countries, CLIMATEWIRE, Dec. 17, 2009, http://www.eenews net/ 
climatewire/2009/12/17/archive/1?terms=hillary+clinton. 
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party more interested in avoiding climate change, it may seek to 
delay mitigation to see whether China will undertake EM, and then 
see if over time some of the uncertainty disappears, or if it can 
evaluate the feasibility of a side payment under a smaller number 
of conditions.  The possibility of side payments and the 
introduction of information asymmetry as to whether a country is 
truly unwilling to undertake mitigation without a side payment 
presents a variety of problems.  If a country believes it can take 
advantage of an information asymmetry and extract a side 
payment, it can create all kinds of mischief, and potentially harm 
its own prospects—assuming the country is genuinely interested in 
mitigating to avoid climate change. 
B. Adaptation and Geo-engineering 
“Adaptation” is the general term for a wide range of things 
that can be done by a country to adjust to life in a climate-changed 
world.125  Adaptation could include, for example, relocation of 
populations so that an increased frequency of tropical storms 
would no longer swamp the population and necessitate a costly 
rescue and relief response, relocation of agriculture or the genetic 
modification of seeds to yield more drought-resistant crops, or the 
construction of sea walls to protect a city from the intruding sea. 
“Geo-engineering” measures aim to reduce the atmospheric 
concentration of greenhouse gases directly, without addressing the 
sources of the greenhouse gases, thus solving the mitigation 
problem by avoiding it entirely.  Still in its early developmental 
stages, proposed geo-engineering measures have included: the 
promotion of ocean algal growth, which would capture carbon 
dioxide from the atmosphere; the launching of tiny particle-sized 
mirrors into the upper stratosphere so as to reflect sunlight and 
prevent it from reaching the Earth; and the creation of synthetic 
trees that are able to sequester greater amounts of carbon 
dioxide.126  Much more innocuous geo-engineering measures 
include the painting of roofs white, so as to reflect sunlight more 
effectively and increase the amount of heat that is bounced off the 
Earth’s surface and radiated back out into space.127  Obviously, 
 
 125 See supra note 76. 
 126 For a general discussion of geo-engineering, see HENSON, supra note 16, 
at 330–32. 
 127 See Mark Henderson, Professor Steven Chu: Paint the World White to 
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these and any future geo-engineering ideas will have their own 
environmental consequences, which would need to be evaluated 
and compared with the effects of climate change itself. 
For better or for worse, adaptation and geo-engineering have 
been, at various times and to various degrees, viewed as 
alternatives to mitigation.  These would have the advantage of 
reducing the country’s reliance on others in coming up with a 
strategy to address climate change.  For countries with the 
resources to do so, both adaptation and geo-engineering could 
substitute in full or in part for efforts to reduce greenhouse gases. 
Unsurprisingly, controversy has surrounded both adaptation 
and geo-engineering.  If it became clear that adaptation or geo-
engineering offered a less costly or less complicated option than 
mitigation, then countries would likely divert resources away from 
mitigation efforts and towards adaptation efforts.  Similarly, geo-
engineering poses a threat of draining resources away from 
mitigation.  This is a bitter pill for environmental organizations to 
swallow—the concession that environmental preservation may not 
be the best strategy, and that money and attention may move away 
from mitigation (i.e., preservation) efforts.  Moreover, many 
industrial interests, large and small, have become heavily invested 
in a low-carbon future.  From General Electric, one of the world’s 
largest industrial conglomerates, which has invested heavily in 
wind turbine technology, to Owl Power, a three-person Boylston, 
Massachusetts-based company that converts cooking grease into 
electricity for restaurants,128 many of the world’s industries have 
already started to rebuild an economy predicated on mitigation as 
the dominant response to climate change.  These interests as well 
would naturally view adaptation and geo-engineering skeptically.  
After a period of initial controversy, objections to adaptation seem 
to have abated, as it becomes clear that climate change is already 
occurring,129 and especially when it is couched as aid to less 
developed countries.  Geo-engineering remains radioactive in 
 
Fight Global Warming, TIMES (London), May 27, 2009, available at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article6366639.ece. 
 128 See About Owl Power Company, VEGAWATT, 
http://www.vegawatt.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2010). 
 129 See, e.g., W. Neil Adger, Social Capital, Collective Action, and Adaptation 
to Climate Change, 79 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 387, 387–88 n.1 (2003); David 
Noble, Getting Started on Adaptation to Climate Change, 116 MUN. WORLD 5, 8 
(2006). 
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many quarters.130 
In the context of this article’s game, adaptation and geo-
engineering can be modeled as alternatives to mitigation, and 
doing so yields some additional insights.  The costs of adaptation 
and geo-engineering, if they can be estimated, may serve as an 
upper bound to the damages of climate change.  This does require 
the heroic (but illustrative) assumption that adaptation or geo-
engineering would be effective in placing a country’s future 
population in as good a position as it would in a world without 
climate change.  But a country losing faith in the international 
process for agreeing to mitigation measures may decide that other 
approaches are worth investigation. 
In this game,  A  and  B  can be viewed conceptually as not 
just the damages from climate change, but the minimum of: (1) the 
damages from climate change; (2) the costs of full adaptation; and 
(3) the costs of effective geo-engineering.  Of course, no 
adaptation response or geo-engineering scheme can satisfy the 
heroic assumption that they can provide a social welfare status that 
is fully equivalent to the complete avoidance of climate change.  
But a country could rationally ask itself whether it was cheaper to 
find ways to mitigate (reduce the emission of greenhouse gases), 
or to find ways to adapt to and live with the effects of climate 
change, or to geo-engineer itself out of its current climate 
predicament.  And once a country had made such a determination, 
it could begin to move resources to the best of the three strategies. 
If conceptually,  A or B is the minimum of: (1) damages from 
climate change; (2) the costs of adaptation; or (3) the costs of geo-
engineering, then  A  and  B  could well be lower than originally 
assumed in this model.  A country would view its choices, 
appropriately discounted, as (1) mitigation measures to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions; (2) adaptation measures; (3) geo-
engineering; and (4) doing nothing and suffering the damages from 
 
 130 See, e.g., Martin Bunzl, Researching Geoengineering: Should Not or 
Could Not?, 4 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS (Oct.–Dec. 2009), 
http://www.iop.org/EJ/article/1748-9326/4/4/045104/erl9_4_045104.html.  But 
see H. Damon Matthews & Ken Caldeira, Transient Climate – Carbon 
Simulations of Planetary Geoengineering, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9949, 
9949 (2007), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/104/24/9949.abstract (“It 
is perhaps not surprising that there has been recent renewed interest in possible 
top-down technological fixes of the climate/energy problem . . . .”). 
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climate change.131  This introduces another threat to cooperation: 
the possibility that some countries may start to think that 
adaptation and geo-engineering are alternatives to cooperation. 
Again, returning to an earlier theme, the hint that a country 
might adapt or geo-engineer would send an alarming signal to 
other countries.  In a game where cooperation and interdependence 
are the keys to mitigating climate change, the mere suggestion that 
a country may be less enthusiastic about mitigation is enough to 
encourage defection.  In the arithmetic and vernacular of this 
game, if a country were to flirt with adaptation or geo-engineering, 
it might be indicating that its perception of its damages might be 
lowered by one of these strategies, and that it might be more 
difficult for another country to believe that  Ax  or  By  might be 
large enough to sustain a cooperative Nash equilibrium.  In 
particular, adaptation costs, to the extent that they are incurred in 
the future, would be discounted and might seem more attractive 
than present-day mitigation measures.  And to repeat a disclaimer 
made earlier, this article takes as its starting point the proposition 
that allowing climate change to advance unchecked is an 
inefficient global assumption of risk, but this model could well 
accommodate the conclusion that the most efficient outcome is a 
non-cooperative one, particularly if adaptation or geo-engineering 
measures can play a role in substituting for mitigation. 
Adaptation and geo-engineering also threaten the prospect for 
cooperation in mitigation in yet another way: they could induce a 
search to lower adaptation or geo-engineering costs, thereby 
further reducing the prospects for cooperation.  So it could be that 
if China engages in posturing before period 1 in order to induce a 
side payment, the U.S. could eschew EM, and switch research 
resources from mitigation to adaptation.  In the process, the U.S. 
could figure out how to lower its adaptation costs, and in turn truly 
make itself and other countries inclined to avoid mitigation 
altogether.  Adaptation and geo-engineering can thus derail 
international mitigation cooperation by channeling research and 
development resources away from mitigation. 
There is, however, for those hoping for cooperation, a positive 
contribution to be made by adaptation and geo-engineering.  
 
 131 It would be hard to believe, however, that a country would not find at least 
some adaptation measures worthwhile, and thus rule out doing absolutely 
nothing. 
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Adaptation and geo-engineering may play a role in facilitating 
cooperation by curbing strategic behavior.  The root of strategic 
behavior is an imbalance in the ways that countries perceive their 
own damages from climate change.  If, under uncertainty, China is 
prone to overestimate U.S. damages  A  and the prospects for an 
American side payment, then an alternative to mitigation that 
effectively caps  A  could serve to dampen such over-optimism.  In 
effect, adaptation and geo-engineering are, by creating alternative 
avenues of reducing damages, objective ways of calling the bluff 
of would-be strategically-behaving countries.  Given the potential 
for mischief caused by strategic behavior, this could be a very 
important feature of adaptation and geo-engineering.  This 
dynamic, while unappealing to those hoping for cooperation, may 
explain some of the push especially for geo-engineering. 
Given the difficulty of achieving cooperation for mitigation, 
adaptation and geo-engineering would naturally earn the ire of 
environmental organizations and internationalists still hoping for a 
global pact.  But since glaciers seem to be melting at a faster rate 
than the rate at which international climate negotiations seem to be 
proceeding, it is also natural for countries to entertain alternatives 
to international agreement on mitigation.  Adaptation and geo-
engineering become off-ramps for getting out of the collective 
action problem, and freeing a country from obsessing over whether 
other countries will cooperate in mitigation or free-ride.132  
Adaptation and geo-engineering become ways of hedging and of 
diversifying a country’s portfolio of responses to climate change. 
C. Modeling More Than Two Players 
The proposed game is composed of two players and 
incorporates a very strong assumption about free-riding: any free-
riding is fatal to cooperation.  This strong assumption is consistent 
with the results of the WITCH model, which finds that cooperating 
coalitions must achieve near-universality of mitigation in order to 
be effective.133  Certainly, WITCH confirmed that no possible 
coalition can be effective in avoiding climate change if it lacks 
 
 132 Geo-engineering, to the extent that it could be effectively undertaken by a 
single country, would clearly solve collective action problems, even as it 
introduces other externalities, both positive (removing greenhouse gases from the 
atmosphere) and negative (the negative side-effects of geo-engineering 
measures). 
 133 Bosetti et al., supra note 52, at 27. 
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either the U.S. or China.134  But expanding the model in this article 
to simulate negotiations among many countries, not just two, is 
still illustrative.  It should be no surprise that even adding a third or 
fourth player to a game in which success must be a joint product 
drives the likelihood of successful cooperation down sharply.  
Imagine Figure 2, the matrix of outcomes of the game under 
perfect information, only in three dimensions, or four, or more.  It 
is not difficult to imagine that as the dimensions increase, the 
chances of cooperation decrease, as the green box in the matrix 
becomes the green cube in an even bigger cube, and so on. 
To take a simple numerical example, even if one were 
generously to assume that there was, say, a 75 percent chance that 
each country would mitigate, needing just 5 countries to sign on 
would reduce the joint product to a mere 10 percent.  In light of 
those odds, any individual country could be forgiven for lacking 
the stomach even to undertake modest EM measures.  Cooperation 
is much more difficult to achieve in a multi-player game. 
Expanding the game to multiple players also further amplifies 
the importance of signaling.  As discussed above in Part IV.A.1, 
signaling not only plays an important role in conveying 
information, but the importance of those signals are compounded 
when we allow for more game-playing stages.  Because 
cooperation is a joint product, any information that may indicate 
one player is less likely to cooperate will in turn make it less 
attractive for the other player to cooperate, and so on.  And to the 
extent that an ill-advised attempt to extract a side payment sends a 
signal to the rest of the world about a country’s willingness to 
mitigate, it creates a potential for defection to snowball. 
With more players in the mix, it becomes apparent that a 
signal becomes still more consequential.  A signal in a game with 
more players would reverberate and have a greater effect on more 
decision environments.  Negative signals in a multi-player game 
would multiply the disruptive effect on cooperation in mitigation.  
Again, applying the strong free-riding assumption of this model—
that any free-riding is fatal to cooperation—the probability of 
cooperation is a joint product of the probability that every country 
will find it in its interest to resist free-riding and cooperate.  In 
such an environment, a negative signal has the effect of changing 
the decision environment for all of the other countries, lowering 
 
 134 Cf. id. 
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the probabilities of cooperation for all of the other countries, which 
in turn makes it even less likely that LM will seem to be a rational 
course of action for any of the other countries. 
For those that have been critical of the meekness of various 
measures proposed thus far,135 this game holds some lessons.  With 
cooperation such a fragile proposition, and with even small signals 
playing important roles in each country’s decision environment, 
this game illustrates how important even small EM measures 
might be in salvaging some prospects for future cooperation.  
Cooperation in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions might 
necessarily have to consist of a series of small steps. 
D. Other Strategies to Enhance Cooperation 
Almost everything that can be done to the model has the 
effect of discouraging cooperation.  But assuming (without 
arguing) that as a normative matter this would be a bad outcome—
that adaptation and geo-engineering are red herrings and that 
climate change is truly dangerous enough to warrant costly and 
concerted efforts to avoid it—then countries would still be well-
advised to try to cooperate, and to reach an international agreement 
to reduce greenhouse gases.  In addition to highlighting the pitfalls 
facing mitigation, this model suggests some strategies that may 
encourage cooperation in mitigation. 
One recent phenomenon that has emerged in international 
climate negotiations is shaming.  Increasingly, a moral stigma has 
attached to those countries perceived as interfering with an 
international process to reduce emissions.  In 2007, during 
multilateral negotiations over a successor to the Kyoto Protocol, an 
American objection to language inserted by China and India was 
greeted with a now-famous response from the representative of 
Papua New Guinea: 
“I would ask the United States, we ask for your leadership . . . 
[b]ut if for some reason you’re not willing to lead, leave it to the 
rest of us . . . . Please get out of the way.”136 
 
 135 For example, on the weakness of pledges put on the table as part of the 
Copenhagen summit, Alden Meyer of the Union of Concerned Scientists has this 
to say: “The pledges put on the table to date do not put us on track to meet that 
goal and will make it very difficult for us politically and technically beyond 2020 
to meet that target.”  John M. Broder, Most Countries Submit Emission 
Reduction Targets by Deadline, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, at A10. 
 136 Andrew Revkin, Issuing a Bold Challenge to the U.S. Over Climate, N.Y. 
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The ensuing thunder of applause embarrassed the United 
States representative, Paula Dobriansky, into dropping her 
objection.  The New Guinea representative acknowledged that the 
portrayal of the United States as the pariah in these negotiations 
was orchestrated by China and India by introducing measures that 
were known beforehand to be objectionable to the United States.137  
Nevertheless, the effect of that famous incident has been to raise 
the costs of countries seeking to scuttle international agreement on 
emissions reduction.  Recently, China and India themselves seem 
to have become more sensitive to criticism for holding up climate 
negotiations.138 
What does moral stigma mean for countries reluctant to 
mitigate?  In this game, it can be added into the damages of 
climate change.  The model is straightforward in that the higher the 
damages of climate change for a country, the more likely that 
country will mitigate.  If a group of countries are willing to punish 
non-mitigators somehow—perhaps by opposing international 
initiatives favoring the non-mitigators—then it is possible that 
non-mitigation might be deterred.  In the vernacular of this game, 
countries can find geo-political ways of increasing  A  or  B. 
Instead of a mere moral stigma that is manifested as future 
geo-political opposition, mitigating countries may opt to use 
international trade, either as a carrot or a stick, to encourage 
cooperation in mitigation.  As a stick, trade measures such as 
“border tax adjustments”139 that seek to levy a tax on imports (and 
 
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, at F2 (Statement of Kevin Conrad, Representative from 
Papua New Guinea). 
 137 Revkin, supra note 136. 
 138 For example, both countries have recently joined the Copenhagen Accord.  
China has announced it will voluntarily reduce its carbon intensity by 40 to 45 
percent by 2020, compared with 2005 levels.  India will reduce its carbon 
intensity by 20 to 25 percent by 2020, compared with 2005 levels, excluding its 
agricultural sector.  John M. Broder, Climate Goal is Supported by China and 
India, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, at A9. 
 139 A border tax adjustment is a levy on imported goods that are meant to 
equalize certain tax burdens.  Under Article II of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), only “direct taxes” that can be attributed to an 
immutable characteristic of a traded good may be the subject of a border tax 
adjustment.  Sales taxes generally fall into this category.  Taxes that can be less 
easily calculated and attributed to a particular good would generally not be legal 
under the GATT.  For a fuller explanation and an analysis of the trade-legality of 
border tax adjustments, see Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and 
Competitiveness Concerns: the Limits and Options of International Trade Law 
(Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Solutions, Working Paper No. 07-02, 2007), 
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a subsidy on exports) when mitigating countries trade with non-
mitigating countries may play a role in encouraging cooperation.  
A prevalent domestic concern with regulating greenhouse gases 
has been the effect on domestic industries, as they compete in the 
international market with industries in countries that may not 
regulate greenhouse gases.  This is of particular concern with 
industries that are energy-intensive, such as steel, cement, 
aluminum, and basic chemicals.140  While the legality and 
desirability of using trade sanctions to force non-cooperators into 
cooperation has been debated and generally rejected,141 the abject 
failure of countries to make any significant progress in reaching 
international agreement might cause some to re-think this 
approach.  This is especially true because the common assumption 
that border tax adjustments are GATT-illegal has, of late, been 
analyzed with some greater care and questioned.142  It may be that 
border tax adjustments would survive scrutiny by the World Trade 
Organization after all.  If so, they may represent an important tool 
in bringing countries into an international agreement to cooperate 
in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions.  If nothing else, they could 
provide political cover for leaders that have to face down domestic 
industries that might oppose cooperation in mitigation. 
A safer course would be to use trade measures as a carrot.  
Despite being contrary to the letter of the GATT,143 free trade 
zones, such as that created by the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, have proliferated.  Creating a “club good” by linking 
trade liberalization among countries cooperating in mitigating to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions stands a stronger change of 
 
available at http://www nicholas.duke.edu/institute/ internationaltradelaw.pdf. 
 140 See, e.g., TREVOR HOUSER ET AL., LEVELING THE CARBON PLAYING FIELD 
42–46 (2008) (noting that of these carbon-intensive industries, aluminum and 
cement face significant pressure from imports, which satisfy a relatively high 
fraction of demand). 
 141 See, e.g., BARRETT, supra note 10, at 388–89 (criticizing the use of border 
tax adjustments, and arguing that they would be hard to calculate and have never 
been an effective means of enforcing international environmental obligations). 
 142 See, e.g., Pauwelyn, supra note 139. 
 143 Article 1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the so-called 
“Most Favored Nation” clause, provides that “any advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or 
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of 
all other contracting parties.”  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 1, 
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, A-12, 55 U.N.T.S 194, 198. 
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surviving WTO scrutiny than a trade sanction.  Although the 
economic effects are similar, international trade law seems to view 
such carrots as more benign than sticks, such as sanctions.144 
Perhaps even less intrusively, countries might participate in 
the effort to advance the science of climate change, and perhaps 
even adaptation and geo-engineering.  The psychological biasing 
effect of uncertainty has tilted countries (and their human 
policymakers and leaders) towards inaction.  Participating in the 
IPCC, which has a continuing role in reducing scientific 
uncertainty, is necessary but not sufficient.  However great the 
pains that the IPCC has taken to present scientifically credible 
evidence and findings, it has still been relentlessly attacked for the 
inevitable missteps that occur given the magnitude of its 
undertaking.145  Surveys suggest that the world public seems to 
overestimate the uncertainty of the scientific conclusions of the 
IPCC and other climate scientists.146  As noted above, many 
industry groups have been funding efforts to emphasize the 
uncertainty, if not to actively mislead the world public.147  
Whatever the cause, the awarding of a Nobel Prize to the IPCC 
 
 144 Free trade agreements would arguably be inconsistent with the most 
favored nations clause of the GATT except that, under certain conditions, they 
are explicitly exempted.  Article XXIV of the GATT defines a “free trade area” 
as “a group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other 
restrictive regulations . . . are eliminated on substantially all the trade between 
the constituent territories in products originating in such territories.”  Special 
Protocol Relating to Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, Mar. 24, 1948, 62 Stat. 2013, 2015, 62 U.N.T.S 56, 62 (amending General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 24 § 8(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S 194). 
 145 Recently, the IPCC was criticized for a misstatement on the rapidity at 
which Himalayan glaciers are melting.  Lauren Morello, IPCC Admits Error on 
Himalayan Glacier Warning, E&E NEWS PM, Jan. 20, 2010, 
http://www.eenews net/eenewspm/2010/01/20/archive/3?terms=IPCC+admits+er
ror.  The IPCC acknowledged that it erred in placing too much reliance upon a 
1999 interview with an Indian glaciologist, in predicting that Himalayan glaciers 
would melt by the year 2035.  However, the IPCC emphasized that the overall 
conclusion regarding accelerating melting in the Himalayas was unchanged by 
the embarrassment and still consistent with current science.  See IPCC Statement 
on the Melting of Himalayan Glaciers (Jan. 20, 2010), available at 
http://www.eenews net/features/documents/2010/01/20/document_pm_04.pdf. 
 146 Matthew C. Nisbet & Teresa Myers, Twenty Years of Public Opinion 
About Global Warming, 71 Pub. Opinion Q. 444, 453 tbls.13 & 14 (2007) 
(showing that people generally believe there is controversy and disagreement 
among scientists about global warming). 
 147 See McCright & Dunlap, supra note 43, at 348. 
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might be viewed as an attempt to shore up the IPCC’s international 
standing and perhaps reduce the mistaken public impression that 
the conclusions of the IPCC are less certain than they actually are.  
In any case, broader and deeper research efforts into climate 
science are unlikely to be money wasted, as these could shed light 
on some extremely important and poorly understood questions we 
have about our planet.  But more importantly, better science can 
improve the decision environment for climate policymakers. 
Finally, another interesting path forward has been suggested 
by a fiction writer; it can find some support from the lessons of 
this game: a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and China—not 
as proxies or representatives for others, but as the actual individual 
countries—on a cooperative mitigation strategy.  The novel 
Ultimatum, by Matthew Glass, takes place in the future and begins 
with a newly-elected U.S. president that is contemplating the 
continuation of secret bilateral negotiations with China, essentially 
as an end run around a failed Kyoto process.  The reasoning, as put 
forward by Glass, is that agreement between two superpowers 
removes the holdout problems inherent in the Kyoto process and 
removes the many distractions that have made international 
agreement so intractable.148  Bilateral agreement is considerably 
easier than multilateral agreement, and, once the U.S. and China 
agree, then a powerful coalition of the two largest greenhouse gas 
emitters and probably the two most powerful countries could use 
its economic and political clout, including its two votes on the 
United Nations Security Council, to induce other countries to 
cooperate.  If they could actually act in concert, the U.S. and China 
could considerably raise the political and economic costs of non-
mitigation.  This would especially be true if the U.S.-China 
coalition could count on the support of the European Union, which 
has led mitigation efforts and efforts to reach international 
agreement on mitigation.  What the Glass idea does is break down 
the intractable game of international climate negotiations into 
smaller, more manageable parts that may be less vulnerable to 
some of the game-theoretic dynamics modeled in this game, such 
as strategic behavior. 
Is this fanciful fiction or a creative (if Machiavellian) way 
forward?  Countries engaged in international politics do not 
currently seem to have an appetite for such unilateralism, 
 
 148 GLASS, supra note 93, at 48–51. 
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particularly given the questionable international legality of some 
inevitable aspects of such an approach.  But this could change if 
damages from climate change begin to crystallize and show 
themselves to be catastrophic risks.  If the exigency of climate 
change became sufficiently clear, and international climate 
diplomacy continued to fail, trade law could well turn a blind eye 
towards some heretofore questionable trade practices. 
There are countless ways in which countries can change the 
payoffs of other countries in their approach to climate change and 
affect the prospects for cooperation in mitigation.  What this 
Article argues is that they are best understood not as moral urgings 
or attempts to construct an international legal order that compels 
adherence through an expression of common interests, but as 
attempts to affect the decision environment for other countries.  
The history of international climate diplomacy seems to indicate 
that those who approach climate negotiations as an intellectual 
battleground of ideas in which they expect to prevail will be sorely 
disappointed. 
CONCLUSION 
Scott Barrett and others have already persuasively argued that 
it was a mistake to use the Montreal Protocol’s phase-out of 
ozone-depleting chemicals as a template for reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions.149  But the way forward is not entirely clear, in light 
of the efforts that have already been expended in pursuing a 
multilateral agreement on reducing greenhouse gases, and in light 
of the disappointing results thus far.  This Article does not propose 
a policy path, for an individual country or for the world 
community of nations.  Rather, of the countless ideas and 
proposals that have already been raised, this Article attempts to 
make some sense of some of them. 
This Article began with an argument that a new theory of 
international climate negotiations was needed and then set out to 
provide one.  In its very simple form, the theory described in this 
Article describes the decision environment for each nation 
considering mitigation measures to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions as consisting of four simple factors: (1) its perceived 
damages from climate change; (2) its costs of mitigation; (3) the 
 
 149 BARRETT, supra note 10, at 2. 
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rate at which it discounts the welfare of future generations; and (4) 
the prospect of other countries agreeing to mitigation 
measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
The simple cost-benefit framework is not meant to be a 
normative prescription for national decisionmaking; Martin 
Weitzman’s cautionary note about cost-benefit analysis as a 
determinative decisionmaking tool is important to observe.  
However, Weitzman’s warning notwithstanding, the model does 
present a reasonable description of how politicians and 
policymakers actually consider mitigation measures to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.  Added to this simple model are a 
number of factors unique to climate change which increase the 
complexity but do not fundamentally change the decision 
framework: scientific uncertainty and imperfect information with 
respect to how a country perceives its damages from climate 
change (which gives rise to strategic behavior and poses risks of 
suboptimal failures to cooperate), the costs and likely effectiveness 
of adaptation measures and geo-engineering measures (which 
serve to limit a country’s perceived future damages from climate 
change), and most importantly, the myriad of things that countries 
can do to change the decision environment for other countries. 
On the one hand, the game-theoretic model in this article 
illustrates, perhaps even dramatizes, the powerful effect of even 
the threat of defecting (not reducing greenhouse gas emissions).  
The mere possibility that one country may refuse to mitigate 
increases the chances that another country will refuse to mitigate, 
which in turn increases the chances that still other countries will 
refuse.  Early actions to mitigate are thus important not only 
because they reduce the future cost of late mitigation, but because 
they create an environment where cooperation is made easier.  
That free-riding is such a difficult problem and that agreement is a 
joint product of almost every single major emitter in the world is 
the primary cause of despair for those hoping for multilateral 
agreement on reducing emissions. 
On the other hand, the risks of just hunkering down and 
preparing for a potentially much warmer world are frightening 
enough for many countries that some will consider allowing 
climate change to affect international relations in other ways.  For 
now, the only costs nations seem to be willing to impose upon 
those perceived as blocking international agreement is a mild 
moral stigma.  In the future, nations may feel differently about 
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linking a variety of international issues with the issue of climate 
change.  For example, if some nations continue to push for 
international agreement on reducing emissions, it is hard to 
imagine that they will rule out using international trade to 
assemble coalitions and encourage cooperation, legal or not. 
While the architects of international efforts to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions struggle to obtain agreement from most 
of the 192 nations of the world, some perspective may be useful on 
the myriad of things that are being done.  Much international 
discussion has centered upon how to get countries to agree, or at 
least seem amenable to agreement.  Obtaining buy-in from former 
and current high-emitting recalcitrants such as the United States, 
China, India, and others, from developing countries that seem to 
hold the key to developed country participation, and from 
environmentalists and scientists throughout the world, has seemed 
to be a Sisyphean task.  The goal of this article has been to cast 
these actions and discussions in a game-theoretic light, and to 
explain in part their motivations.  As well, the winnowing of all of 
the variables of climate change down to just fourdamages, 
mitigation costs, discount rates, and the prospect of other 
countries’ cooperationhelps policymakers and analysts keep 
their eye on what it is that can change a country’s decision 
environment. 
The central insight of this Article is that countries’ decision 
environments are highly interdependent.  The interdependency of 
climate decisions is what has been missing from previous analyses 
of international climate negotiations.  What this Article does is 
model these interdependencies.  Rolling all of them into one model 
would make the model intractable; the contribution of this model is 
to build upon a relatively simple base model and simulate each of 
these interdependencies separately.  Explication of this point 
beyond the rudimentary illustrations of this Article would require 
considerably more analysis and computation, but the simple 
insights in this Article would seem to be of value to a policy 
community that has devoted much effort to looking at countries 
and greenhouse gas problems as if they were to be analyzed in 
isolation from each other.  Rather than explicitly model the 
second-, third-, and higher-order effects, this Article aims to 
demonstrate that such thinking is much needed.  The enormous, 
all-encompassing importance of the climate change problem 
demands at least a complete set of analytical tools for 
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understanding why countries and people do the things they do. 
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Appendix A 
Derivation of conditions of perfect information outcomes 
(Figure 2) 
 
As a first step, the conditions are derived for cooperative Nash 
equilibria in each of the four subgames.  Even though in perfect 
information the outcomes are pre-ordained for subgames A, B, and 
C, it is useful to solve the game under different conditions to see 
when non-cooperation results, and when the parties enter the 
different subgames. 
As an illustration, consider Subgame A.  In order for the U.S. 
to LM, it must be true that its payoffs of LM exceed that of not 
mitigating: 
-1-2x > -1-Ax2 
which reduces to the simple condition 
Ax > 2 
Similarly, in order for China to choose to LM, it must be true 
that By > 2.  And in order for there to be cooperation—where both 
parties choose to LM—each country must believe that these 
conditions are satisfied for the other country.  If either country did 
not believe that the condition was satisfied for the other country, it 
would not believe the other would LM, and hence would not itself 
undertake the cost of LM, since both countries must LM in order 
for the world to avoid climate change damages.  Hence, the only 
way that a cooperative solution—both countries LM—can be a 
Nash equilibrium is if both of the following conditions Ax > 2  and  
By > 2 are satisfied, and both countries believe that both conditions 
are satisfied. 
Undertaking a similar solution analysis of Subgame B (where 
the U.S. undertakes EM but China does not), the U.S. will only 
undertake LM if the payoffs of LM (-1-4x) exceed the payoffs of 
not mitigating and accepting climate change (-1-Ax2), which 
reduces to the condition Ax > 4.  The only way that a cooperative 
solution—both countries LM—can be a Nash equilibrium is if 
both of the following conditions are satisfied, and both countries 
believe that both of the conditions are satisfied: 
Ax > 4  and  By > 4. 
The same result obtains in Subgame C, where China 
undertakes EM but the U.S. does not. 
In Subgame D, where neither the U.S. nor China undertakes 
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EM, the only way that a cooperative solution—both countries 
LM—can be a Nash equilibrium is if both of the following 
conditions are satisfied, and both countries believe that both of the 
conditions are satisfied: 
Ax > 6 and By > 6. 
The conditions for a cooperative Nash equilibrium in each of 
the subgames are summarized in the table below. 
Conditions for Cooperative Nash Equilibrium 
Subgame A Ax > 2  and  By > 2 
Subgame B Ax > 4  and  By > 4 
Subgame C Ax > 4  and  By > 4 
Subgame D Ax > 6  and  By > 6 
 
Under perfect information, the solution to subgames A, B, and 
C are all the same: cooperation in avoiding damages from climate 
change.  Conceptually, this is because under perfect information 
each player knows whether ultimately the other player will 
cooperate, and if there is no possibility that the other player will 
cooperate, neither player would bother with EM.  Therefore 
subgames A, B, and C would never take place. 
Formally, consider the U.S.’s decision environment (the same 
analysis can clearly be done for the China side).  If the U.S. does 
EM, then it must, knowing what China will do in each period, have 
determined its payoff of EM was greater than not doing EM.  
Assume first that China is the type to do both EM and LM, 
meaning that the parties are in Subgame A.  That means that the 
U.S. prefers outcome 1 to outcomes 3 and 5 (outcomes 2 and 4 do 
not occur because China will EM): 
-1-2x > -4x and  -1-2x > Ax2 
or, in other words, 
x > ½  and 
x
Ax 12   
so on the U.S. side the condition for a cooperative Nash 
equilibrium  Ax > 2 is necessarily satisfied, since the condition 
x
Ax 12   is a more stringent one. 
Now suppose China was the type to not do EM but do LM 
(the U.S. knows that China has a perception of high damages but a 
low discount factor), meaning that the parties are in Subgame B.  
This means the U.S. prefers outcome 2 to outcome 4 and outcome 
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5, or: 
-1-4x > -6x and  -1-4x > Ax2 
or, in other words, 
x > ½  and 
x
Ax 14   
so that on the U.S. side the condition Ax > 4 for a cooperative 
Nash equilibrium in Subgame B is necessarily satisfied. 
And finally, if China was the type to do neither EM nor LM, 
the U.S. would never do EM. 
Now turning to a formal derivation of the conditions for a 
cooperative Nash equilibrium shown in Figure 2, consider the 
illustrative case Ax > 6  and  4 > By > 6.  It becomes necessary to 
solve the game by backward induction.  Each of the subgames is 
solved and then the conditions for entering the subgames are 
derived. 
If the parties are in Subgame A, a cooperative Nash 
equilibrium occurs, because all that was necessary was that Ax > 2  
and  By > 2.  The same is true for subgames B and C.  If the parties 
are in Subgame D, however, China will not LM and the parties 
will not cooperate, and climate change will occur. 
The next step in backward induction is to ask which subgame 
the parties will enter. 
Case 1: x > ½  and  y > ½.  The parties will enter Subgame 
A—both parties will EM because their discounted payoffs in A are 
greater than in any other subgame. 
For the U.S.: 
-1-2x > -4x because  x > ½ so A is better than C 
and therefore: 
-1-2x > -1-4x so A is better than B 
and also therefore: 
-1-2x > -6x so A is better than the cooperative outcome in D.  
The solution to Subgame D is non-cooperation, because By < 6, 
but we still know that A is better than the non-cooperative solution 
to D because Ax > 6, so we know -1-2x > -6x > -Ax2. 
For China, the same analysis applies, except that the last step 
cannot be inferred, because  By < 6.  However, we know that: 
-1-2y > -4y > By2 because  y > ½ and because By > 4. 
So for Ax > 6, 4 < By < 6, x > ½ and y > ½, the solution is a 
cooperative outcome in Subgame A. 
Case 2: x > ½  and  y < ½.  The parties will enter Subgame 
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B—only the U.S. will EM, but both parties will LM because its 
discounted payoffs in B are greater than in any other subgame. 
For the U.S.: 
-1-4x > -6x > Ax2 because x > ½ and because Ax > 6 so B is 
better than D. 
For China: 
-4y > -By2 because By > 4, so B is better than D, 
and 
-4y > -1-2y because y < ½ so B is better than A. 
So for Ax > 6, 4 < By < 6, x > ½ and y < ½, the solution is a 
cooperative outcome in subgame B. 
Case 3: x < ½  and  y > ½. The parties will enter Subgame 
C—only China will EM but both parties will LM because its 
discounted payoffs in B are greater than in any other subgame. 
For the U.S.: 
-4x > -6x > Ax2 because Ax > 6 so C is better than D. 
For China: 
-1-4y > -6x > By2 because y > ½ and because By > 4, so C is 
better than D. 
So for Ax > 6, 4 < By < 6, x < ½ and y > ½, the solution is a 
cooperative outcome in subgame C. 
Case 4: x < ½  and  y < ½.  The parties will enter Subgame D, 
and neither party will LM. 
For China: 
-1-4y < -6y  because  y < ½  so D is better than C, and 
-1-2y < -4y  because  y < ½  so B is better than A 
If D is better than C and B is better than A, then China will 
never EM. 
For the U.S., the same is true—D being better than B and C 
being better than A also means that the U.S. will never EM. 
The parties will thus enter Subgame D, and the outcome will 
be non-cooperation because By < 6, so China will not LM, and 
knowing this, the U.S. will not LM. 
So for Ax > 6, 4 < By < 6, x < ½ and y < ½, the solution is a 
non-cooperative outcome in Subgame D. 
Case 4 is nevertheless an interesting case because there is an 
unstable Nash equilibrium involving both players doing both EM 
and LM.  None of the conditions above establish that: 
-1-2x < -Bx2  or that  -1-2y < -By2 
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And if somehow both parties were able to coordinate and 
agree to do EM, then the parties would actually enter Subgame A 
where they would rationally both do LM, since we know that Ax > 
6 and By > 4.  The problem is that doing the EM to enter Subgame 
A is a classic prisoner’s dilemma—the dominant strategy for both 
players is to defect, or avoid EM.  If China knows that the U.S. 
will EM, then China’s dominant strategy is to not EM.  
Symmetrically, this is true of the U.S. as well. 
A similar analysis can be undertaken to solve the game by 
backward induction for each of the other possibilities of  Ax and 
By, and examining for each case what happens under different 
assumptions of pairs of x and y.  It can be seen that intuitively, the 
discount factor falling below ½ means that the country will not 
EM.  Depending on values of A and B, then, a cooperative Nash 
equilibrium may or may not occur. 
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Appendix B 
Derivation of conditions for feasibility of a period 1 side payment. 
 
Suppose that: 
Ax > 6  and  By < 2 
Referring to Figure 2, the outcome would be non-cooperation 
and no mitigation whatsoever.  The U.S. would not EM, because it 
knows that China will do nothing to mitigate. 
However, if  Ax is large enough, then the U.S. could afford a 
large-enough side payment to induce China to undertake EM and 
LM.  A side payment could put both the U.S. and China into 
Subgame A. 
For the players to be in Subgame A it must be true that in 
period 1:150 
-1-2x > -Ax2  and  -1-2y > By2 (3a) 
And once in Subgame A, in order for there to be a cooperative 
Nash equilibrium, it must be true in period 2 that: 
Ax > 2  and  By > 2 (3b) 
Conditions 3a and 3b must be satisfied in order for both the 
U.S. and China to do both EM and LM.  But since we are 
assuming that By < 2, at least initially there is no Chinese appetite 
for mitigation, so there would be no cooperative Nash equilibrium.  
But if the U.S. would be willing to make a side payment in the 
amount of s so that: 
-1-2x-s > -Ax2 and -1-2y+s > -By2 (4a) 
putting the players in Subgame A, and also (dividing through 
by -x and -y to reflect that the side payment was made in an earlier 
period, and must be backward-discounted): 
x
sAx  2 and
y
sBy  2  (4b) 
so that once in Subgame A, a cooperative Nash equilibrium 
obtains.  So the game would play out with both players happily 
and efficiently undertaking both EM and LM, with payoffs of 
{-1-s-2x,  -1+s-2y}. 
 
 150 In addition to these conditions, the discount rates must be low enough so 
that Subgame A is preferred to the other subgames.  For illustrative purposes, 
this condition is assumed to be true.  Whether discount rates are actually low 
enough would not change the nature of the analysis of whether side payments 
would be made or not. 
